The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy

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The writings presented here reflect the transformation of U.S. foreign policy in recent years — a process accelerated by the same technological advances which allow this “electronic journal” to be understood as an innovation rather than an oxymoron.

The fundamental purpose of America’s foreign policy has not changed in more than two centuries. It is to protect our citizens, our territory, our livelihood, and our friends.

But the making of American foreign policy has changed because the world has changed. With the Cold War behind us and the global economy encompassing us, there is no clear dividing line between domestic and international affairs. And on many issues, the question of where one agency’s responsibility ends and another’s begins is increasingly blurred.

For example, countering terrorism is both a domestic and international law enforcement imperative, requiring vigorous diplomacy, good intelligence, preparations for emergency response, and the possibility of military action. Fighting HIV/AIDS is a medical challenge, an educational and developmental priority, and a foreign policy necessity. Protecting the global environment demands sound science, sophisticated economic expertise, and hard international bargaining.

On most issues, our diplomats must understand and work well not only with foreign counterparts, but also legislators, nongovernmental organizations, outside experts, and representatives from the private sector, both business and labor. The old geopolitical chessboard is no longer two-dimensional.

Today’s players are not only nations, but a host of non-state actors. The issues are often not separable, but inter-connected. The rules shift with every scientific breakthrough. And although America has enemies, the outcome is not zero-sum: In the long run, we will all do better, or none of us will.

The pieces gathered here make up a thought-provoking collection by a truly distinguished group of government officials, present and former Members of Congress, and other authorities. I commend them to you. For they describe how the world’s leading nation is grappling with the world’s hardest problems. And the more widely that process is understood, the better it will work and the more support it will receive.

— Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
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International relations today have become increasingly more complex and “involve a wide range of issues that, in the 19th century, were never seen as major questions of foreign policy,” says Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas R. Pickering. The nations of the world are growing closer together, he says, and the communications revolution and the information revolution “clearly are having an impact on international diplomacy.” He was interviewed by Contributing Editor Dian McDonald.

**QUESTION:** Who are the most influential players in the development of U.S. foreign policy?

**PICKERING:** They are the President and the Secretary of State, the National Security Advisor to the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and, of course, the Director of Central Intelligence, who provides the other key members of the foreign policy team with the latest information on world events.

These officials constitute the core of the National Security Council, which is the nation’s highest-level foreign policy-making body. And the Secretary of State takes very seriously her primary role of being the principal advisor to the President on foreign policy issues.

**Q:** How do their roles overlap and complement each other in achieving U.S. foreign policy goals?

**PICKERING:** The President and the Secretary of State have to give the most comprehensive consideration to foreign policy issues because of their unparalleled responsibilities at the apex of the U.S. foreign policy-making apparatus. The Secretary of Defense often brings an added dimension to the review of national security questions, and the National Security Advisor to the President coordinates and integrates the activities and functions of all of the members of the foreign policy team. He of course intimately understands the President’s foreign policy priorities and often initiates insightful debates about that agenda during those meetings of the foreign policy principals which the President does not attend.

This National Security Council team, from my own experience, is congenial and cooperative. But that in no way tends to diminish the sharpness of the questions or the seriousness of the debate. They have not allowed personal feelings to intrude on the national interest in the way that sometimes has happened in the past. And they have also worked very hard to maintain the element of confidentiality as they deal with issues over a long period of time.

**Q:** How do you work with Congress in the foreign policy area?

**PICKERING:** The entire foreign policy establishment takes very seriously the Congressional role on any foreign policy issue that comes up for consideration. There is always consideration of how and in what way we need to brief the Congress, get Congressional opinions, and analyze the Congressional approach.

On almost every major foreign policy issue, there are two sets of Congressional considerations. The first has to do with policy — namely how the Congress, which is a very vocal and essential part of the American government, will react to an issue from a policy perspective. We listen to the views of individual members as well as to the Congressional leadership and the committee chairs.

Secondly, Congress has the very important duty of providing funding for government programs, both as part of the annual budget process and often on an emergency basis through supplemental appropriations.
So consideration of the concerns of Congress from the point of view of funding is very important.

In addition, Congress has frequently in recent years legislated on foreign policy issues. Therefore one of the questions we always have to ask ourselves regarding a particular foreign policy initiative is: Will we expect Congressional cooperation or Congressional opposition? And, in either case, will that take the form of legislation? And if so, how would we deal with their efforts at legislation, or should we propose our own legislation? In the latter case, of course, consultations with the Congress are very important.

The President plays the leading role in consulting with Congress, but the Secretary also spends a very large portion of her time conferring with senior Members of the Congress about particular issues. And others of us who work closely with the Secretary also take on some of that responsibility from time to time, with respect to budgetary issues or foreign policy crises.

For example, I recently spent an afternoon on Capitol Hill briefing one of the committees on a particular crisis situation. I spent the evening talking to Members of Congress about Colombia. Senior Administration officials also frequently are involved in telephone discussions with Congressional leaders about foreign policy issues. These activities are a very important part of our responsibilities in the Executive Branch, because it is the necessary coordination between the two branches that makes foreign policy effective.

Q: How would you describe the most critical newly emerging influences on U.S. foreign policy-making?

PICKERING: There are several. Increasingly international relations have become more complex and involve a wide range of issues that, in the 19th century, were never seen as major questions of foreign policy. These include crime, terrorism, the environment, and international health. Dealing with the AIDS problem is a particular concern of the Administration at the present time because of the devastation this disease is wreaking on many economies and in many countries around the world.

These are all now front-and-center issues of foreign policy. They complement the traditional economic issues — trade, macroeconomic reform, and development — as well as many of the traditional political issues — settling crises, dealing with international disputes, dealing with conflicts that have erupted, and exercising diplomacy to prevent future conflicts.

They are also complemented by a growth in multilateral diplomacy, in that many of these issues now find their way into multilateral bodies, some regional and some broadly international.

So issues are increasing in scope and technical complexity because of the fact that the nations of the world are growing closer together. We have all been profoundly affected by the communications revolution and the information revolution, which clearly are having an impact on international diplomacy.

Q: Could you elaborate on how you work with international organizations to achieve U.S. foreign policy goals?

PICKERING: All of us in the foreign affairs community are increasingly conscious of the fact that multilateral bodies — both regional and broadly international — play an extremely important role. In some cases, their role is legislative or quasi-legislative; they actually make the rules. In other cases, they set the international consensus for what must be done at the highest levels.

In terms of traditional problems of war and peace, the UN Security Council, of which we are a permanent member, plays a very important role. During the past 50 years or more, regional and international organizations have developed guidelines to help define and regulate activities in many spheres — from how to conduct business to how to keep airplanes from colliding with each other to regulation of the telecommunications industry.

For all these reasons, working with our counterparts in international organizations is a primary focal point for the Department of State and the other domestic agencies that join with us in carrying out foreign affairs. Some of the domestic agencies have their own direct links with the international organizations in their field. It is the responsibility of the Department of State to make sure that they follow general American foreign policy objectives and continue to be effective in pursuing the national interest.
**Q:** How do the views of foreign leaders and foreign governments factor into the development of U.S. foreign policy?

**PICKERING:** They are always extremely important, and are, of course, especially critical when we have to deal with bilateral questions. Recently, I was involved in three long trips that afforded an opportunity to get the views of leaders in the Balkans, in Latin America, and in the Far East on principal foreign policy questions. These kinds of consultations with foreign leaders are essential because, even though the United States is a world leader in foreign policy, it cannot operate alone. We have to bring friends, allies — and even enemies — along in a cooperative way in order to get things done. The world does not operate on the basis of one country being able to do everything all alone.

The consideration of foreign leaders’ views also is important in a multilateral context because many other countries play leading roles in multilateral forums such as the United Nations, and the way individual countries vote on particular questions is very important to the United States. We undertake a lot of lobbying — we call it in diplomatic language “demarches” — which means, in effect, trying to persuade others, through logic and discussion, of the value and correctness of U.S. views. We also attempt to understand the views of other countries and often try to factor their views into our own, so that we can begin to build the kind of consensus that is necessary to take international action on a particular subject.

**Q:** Do you believe that the media get in the way of foreign policy-making?

**PICKERING:** On some occasions, when diplomacy is being conducted confidentially, and confidentiality is important to its success, transparency too early in the process obviously is not helpful from the point of view of those who are conducting the diplomacy. I think that everyone who deals with diplomacy recognizes that we are in an increasingly freer age, with an increasingly freer flow of information. And most of us believe that this will lead intrinsically and essentially to the betterment of the process and of mankind.

So we are getting used to operating in a goldfish bowl. When the confidentiality of information exchanged with foreign governments is breached, this is sometimes seen as a breach of faith and tends then to color a relationship, maybe unnecessarily, in a bad way. But that is not the press’s fault so much as it is the fault of the source of the information to the press.

Sometimes we believe that press commentary on foreign policy is unfair. I think that governments feel this most strongly about press stories in which they have had no opportunity to make their views known to the writer before the story is published. And from the press’s point of view, it is also important for them to consider whether they have had a full opportunity to know and evaluate all points of view before writing their stories.

It is a responsibility of the press to take into account all points of view and analyze them. One-sided stories, not checked or thoroughly researched, provide a disadvantageous optic for foreign affairs, because in the long run, foreign policy succeeds if it has the support of national publics, which are very much influenced by the media. Nobody expects the media to be the mouthpiece for the government, but we expect that the media at least will know and understand what government views are and be fair in conveying them.

**Q:** How can the media facilitate foreign policy-making?

**PICKERING:** I think the media does so in many ways. But in order for them to convey fair and balanced stories, it is important that they hear what we have to say. We don’t expect the media to be totally uncritical; that probably would mean they weren’t doing their job. On the other hand, we expect there to be a reasonable, factual basis for criticism that doesn’t pretend to ignore the considerations that governments bring to bear in developing policy.

In our government, we are fortunate that the President and the Secretary of State, the chief articulators of U.S. foreign policy, have frequent opportunities to convey their views to the media. There is also a regular briefing process involving spokesmen at the State Department, the White House, and the Defense Department that enables us to convey our views on particular subjects to the media, so we in no way feel that our hands are tied. In many ways, the media is a remarkably important instrument. Not that the government manipulates the
media, but they perform an essential function by treating as news what the government is saying about a particular foreign policy issue.

Q: Why do you believe bipartisanship is essential in U.S. foreign policy-making?

PICKERING: It is my belief that when we have a vital national interest at stake — one that might affect American lives and war and peace, for example — that the controversy ought to stop at the water's edge. That means that any President must be open, in his formulation of foreign policy, to considering, on a bipartisan basis, the views of others inside the country. But once that is done, and the President has made his best judgment about what is in the national interest on an issue of vital importance to the nation, the debate may be continued at home, but it should not be carried abroad. We think the line is crossed when people travel abroad and use their travel status as a platform for trying to change decisions on policy made at home.

Overseas, foreigners should see an America united on central propositions of our foreign policy and the critical ways they are carried out. There must be a national perspective, even if there remain some internal differences.

Q: What is the role of U.S. diplomatic missions abroad in developing U.S. foreign policy?

PICKERING: U.S. diplomatic missions abroad have a serious and important role in the development of foreign policy. This plays out in several ways. One is in their ability to ask all of the questions that are critical to American foreign policy-making and to provide not only the best factual information, but also — and perhaps more importantly — competent analyses of the factors they believe are significant in motivating foreign countries and impelling their host governments’ decisions.

American missions and ambassadors abroad also have a primary responsibility for advising the Secretary and the President about foreign policy, both as to when initiatives should be undertaken and when changes need to be made, as well as what should be, from their vantage point, any new U.S. foreign policy in a particular country or region within their purview. The Assistant Secretaries of State in Washington are always prepared to take their views into account, and need to be the integrating point at which what comes in from overseas, as well as what is developed in Washington, are put together.

Q: What experiences have best prepared you for the pivotal role that you play in U.S. foreign policy-making?

PICKERING: The Foreign Service is essentially a learning career, and I have found this to be most significant for me. If a Foreign Service officer doesn't learn a lot new every day, I don't think he or she is making the best use of his or her career.

The jobs that have been most beneficial to me have been the numerous positions that I have held overseas and the appointments to policy-making functions in Washington. I have had a career in which each job, in my view, has contributed to my being more effective in the next job. So I think it is this combination of constantly educating oneself and constantly knowing that you have the responsibility as a decision-maker to be on top of the issues to the greatest extent that you can be, and to give the best advice that you can, that has best prepared me for my current role.

For all policy-makers, the ability — as the Secretary often says — to think “out of the box” is critical. To try to get to new dimensions of a solution to a problem is often one of the most interesting and important challenges. We all learn, in our experience in foreign affairs, how to weigh the various factors and decide which ones to take into account.

When working in Washington, one of the things one learns is to be alert to and aware of the domestic factors that play a role in foreign policy-making. The Secretary has primary responsibility for that, but she expects her advisors to understand domestic factors, which are less easily seen from a position abroad, and know how to take them into account.

Those are the factors and influences that have been most important to me in trying to provide the best advice I can to the Secretary.
UNITING THE TOOLS OF FORCE AND DIPLOMACY TO ENHANCE SECURITY

By Eric D. Newsom

The ability of the United States to shape international events in ways that advance U.S. interests will in large measure depend on whether the Department of State, together with the Department of Defense and other agencies, can respond creatively and cooperatively to the joint challenges we face in a changing world environment. The world we live in now is undergoing a revolution in technology, communications, and information flow; in business practices and organizational structures; in ways nations relate to one another and respond to their publics; in the ability of multinational corporations and other non-governmental organizations to influence international events; and in how regional and international organizations respond to conflict and humanitarian and natural disasters.

Our military has recognized that these factors contribute to a "Revolution in Military Affairs" that may well be changing the very nature and conduct of war. They are seeking to adapt to the new realities both within the individual service structure (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) and in the "joint" world in which the capabilities of each of the services must be brought to bear to achieve U.S. security objectives. The new world environment has demanded a new way of being a soldier, sailor, airman, or Marine. It now often requires an understanding of international politics, ethnic rivalries, local politics in a foreign country, and how fair elections can work — as much as how to command a unit and take the next hill or piece of land.

In much the same way, the State Department is experiencing a kind of "Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs" in which the role of the diplomat in the 21st century and the way we communicate, make decisions, negotiate, and conduct public relations (which we call public diplomacy) — even the very nature of the work that we do — have radically changed. Diplomats today are out in the field working with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) on anti-drug campaigns in Latin America, flying in military helicopters over Northern Iraq, assisting refugees and planning non-combatant evacuations in Africa, implementing regional security cooperation efforts in Central Europe, and planning the next phase of civilian operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor.

The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Revolution in Diplomatic Affairs bring the work of the soldier and the work of the diplomat to an intersection on an almost daily basis worldwide. The international environment and the challenges we face are such that our policy-makers often must use the military and the diplomatic instruments in concert rather than as distinct, separate tools to achieve our goals.

In the Gulf War, our military planned and conducted Desert Storm in concert with a coalition of partners that required the work of diplomats to assemble and to maintain. In Bosnia and Kosovo, and similar peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, diplomacy must be employed to coordinate with allies and partners on a host of issues ranging from managing the electoral process to treatment of international war criminals. Following Hurricane Mitch, when the U.S. military responded to urgent calls for help from...
beleaguered governments, diplomats negotiated terms of entry and departure and helped facilitate the military’s disaster relief work. In other world regions, diplomats and soldiers sit together in the meeting halls of NATO and the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) Regional Forum.

Without naming it as such, we are evolving — in practical ways every day — into a new kind of “interagency jointness” in which State and Defense cooperate to achieve the goals set out for us by the President and our policy leaders. Secretary of State Albright and Secretary of Defense Cohen exemplify this new trend. In a recent op-ed piece in the Washington Post, they wrote: “As Secretaries of Defense and State, we work daily to combine the tools of force and diplomacy in order to protect the security and advance the interests of the American people.” They went on to say, “Our armed forces must remain the best-led, best-trained and best-equipped in the world....But we also need first class diplomacy. Because on many occasions we will rely on diplomacy as our first line of defense — to cement alliances, build coalitions, and find ways to protect our interests without putting our fighting men and women at risk.”

The U.S. military has been tasked in the President’s National Security Strategy report to prepare itself to respond across the full spectrum of military operations, including: major theater warfare, peace enforcement, hostile and non-hostile non-combatant evacuations, humanitarian and disaster relief in hostile and non-hostile environments, and simply creating favorable and interoperable relations with foreign militaries who can support us in the military tasks we undertake. It is clear that at every notch on this spectrum, diplomacy will be an integral element of success — either to reduce or eliminate the need for use of force, maintain coalitions, or negotiate peace.

Thus, in any scenario for the future, our ability to operate jointly will have a profound impact on America’s leadership in the world and effectiveness in protecting our interests and those of our allies and friends. This will require us to cooperate not only at the highest levels and on an ad hoc basis, but regularly in the corridors of our bureaucracies where we plan and conduct our nation’s business.

Success will require habits of cooperation that will undergird success when our leaders employ an instrument of policy that is at once military and diplomatic. We need to understand the nature of this mixed or joint instrument, and what it requires from the two or more sets of bureaucracies called upon to implement our national security strategy.

Since returning to the State Department in 1994, I have seen change, in both State and Defense, in how we think about and approach the marrying of force and diplomacy in pursuit of our national objectives. Together we have achieved fundamental strategic objectives for the United States in the post-Cold War world. Yet, we have a long way to go. Historical differences, institutional cultures, and stereotypes have fostered attitudes of territoriality and some distrust in our dealings with each other’s organizations — or at least very different conceptions of our respective roles and missions.

In order for our leaders to integrate force and diplomacy as a new sort of policy tool, the Defense and State Departments will have to break out of old cultural and institutional barriers to an unprecedented extent and find new, creative ways of planning and doing business together.

This is a major goal of the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, and we are pursuing it vigorously. Some are skeptical about this new approach and strongly urge us to go slowly.

Frankly, I don’t think the United States can afford to have us inch along in this process. Though we can analyze trends and make predictions, we do not know for certain when and where the next conflict will arise that will require the combined use of force and diplomacy. Though we managed in Bosnia and Kosovo, ad hoc cooperation should evolve into better institutional ties and arrangements that allow us to know one another and respond rapidly when the mix of force and diplomacy is required in an unpredictable international environment.

For this reason, we are developing methods to promote cooperation, coordination, cohesion, and consensus on how best to use our diplomatic and military tools to shape the international environment.
At its essence, this means planning together from the top down, and then cooperating in implementation. This will involve serious interaction between State and Defense in developing State’s foreign policy goals as well as its bureau and embassy program plans. It also should involve serious interaction in the formulation of goals and objectives in defense policy, and in such key planning exercises as the Quadrennial Defense Review and regional military “theater engagement plans.”

This is not to say that each agency should take over the other’s work or dictate or meddle in each other’s business. At a certain point, soldiers must be soldiers, and diplomats must be diplomats. Rather, the goal is to develop and implement plans and policies that are informed by and in sync with one another in fulfillment of the President’s National Security Strategy. We’re trying to do that now in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, working closely with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other sectors of the military establishment to achieve this goal.

Second, as we seek to shape the international environment and respond to current events, we need to better coordinate the work of all of the interagency players, not only Defense and State. We are making progress in this area. One of the highlights of my tenure as assistant secretary for political-military affairs has been the work that we have done to advance political and military coordination on complex contingency operations (such as Kosovo and our role in East Timor). An important tool is Presidential Decision Directive-56 (PDD-56), which provides mechanisms for interagency cooperation in these circumstances. As the bombing campaign in Kosovo wore on, 30 military and civilian officers from 18 agencies, bureaus, and offices collaborated over several intense weeks of work to produce a 46-page “mission analysis.” This ultimately shaped the UN Mission in Kosovo and KFOR (Kosovo Peacekeeping Force) operations and helped synchronize international efforts after the bombing stopped. Despite initial skepticism on the part of some, this process was shown to work better than even the optimists had predicted.

Now we are seeking clearer, more effective mechanisms to make the PDD-56 process work better. A new contingency planning Interagency Working Group will greatly advance this effort.

This new way of cooperating is a challenge for both military and civilians. Every U.S. military officer has studied the great Prussian military thinker Karl von Clausewitz and understands that military operations and objectives are always subordinate to strategic political and diplomatic goals. But that understanding has not necessarily led to the conclusion that civilians should sit at the military planning table. Today’s international environment continues to call for limited, precise, often untraditional uses of military power in the pursuit of specific — but sometimes rapidly changing — political objectives. This will require a more open approach to planning interlinked military and political objectives.

The State Department also will have to alter its traditional conceptions. We are only beginning to understand what it means when we say that our work does not end when we negotiate an agreement. The abstractions of a settlement must be made operational. We need to sweat the kind of details we may normally ignore. We must be willing to deal with matters that were not previously part of the diplomatic realm: how to create police forces, how to rebuild defunct judicial systems, how to reestablish a functioning currency, how to make an uncooperative host nation military accept civilian authority and stop massacring opponents, and how to perform a host of other, unusually uncongenial, tasks.

Joint planning will never be easy, even in the best of all possible worlds. During the planning for the period after the bombing campaign in Kosovo, strong differences surfaced between Defense and State. At times, parts of the Defense Department buttoned up and went silent whenever State officials showed up. It took some battering on the gates to get insights into military planning and thinking. Both departments fought hard about issues like policing, military support to civil administration, and so on. To the credit of both, we did not paper over our disagreements. There were vigorous debates.

But, before anyone was deployed in support of the post-bombing effort, we came to closure on an agreed strategy and plan. Great and contentious issues were argued and settled before, not after, mission start-up, providing those who implemented the plan with clarity of purpose and division of labor. I contend that the whole process was of great value, and a precedent for
the future, even if subsequent events in Kosovo did not go according to plan. As the late president General Dwight Eisenhower once said, “A plan is worthless, but planning is everything.”

In addition to State-Defense planning, our international environment also requires coordination with the U.S. Agency for International Development, which is often called upon to organize the response to humanitarian crises throughout the world, drawing on U.S. military resources. These humanitarian efforts sometimes take place in the midst of a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation, making coordination among the various components absolutely imperative.

Not every issue or challenge requiring close coordination is a complex contingency operation or a major humanitarian effort. The U.S. effort to shape the international environment requires objectives that are in sync and actions that are well coordinated. To facilitate this daily coordination at the working levels, we might do well to develop a “Country Team” approach in Washington comparable to the one that works so well at our embassies abroad. To some extent, we do this in the Interagency Working Group process. But this process is often issue specific rather than ongoing; we need further opportunities for a free-flowing exchange of ideas and information.

As a means to overcome institutional barriers and stereotypes, I recommend various measures: We need to expand the existing program of exchanging officers between the Defense and State Departments both in Washington and in the field. We should look for more opportunities for Foreign Service Officers to serve on senior military staffs, and at the same time, we should offer opportunities for senior military officers to hold policy-level positions in the State Department. I would like to see military officers serving at the Deputy Assistant Secretary level in State, and State officers serving in the Defense Department in the same capacity, as in the past.

In addition, we need to look at opportunities for joint training. We should increase the number of State Department officers who attend service schools. And I would like to see our own National Foreign Affairs Training Center open its doors wider to military colleagues as we study regional policies, negotiating, and other foreign service professional skills and political-military issues.

Finally, there is a compelling reason for those of us in the State-Defense security community to cooperate from the top down and the bottom up: our responsibility to the men and women in the military and in the Foreign Service who serve on the front lines of defense for the United States in some of the most difficult places in the world. When we conduct our business in Washington at the rarefied levels of planning and interagency discussion, it is easy to forget that our success or failure to act effectively together can have serious consequences for the actual people called upon to implement our decisions and directives. It pains me every time I hear our military in the field say they do not understand what our policies are and how they are supposed to be advancing them. We need to make sure that they go out with the clearest goals and objectives, the best-crafted plans, and the highest quality equipment we can get for them. In today’s world, that requires “joint” cooperation by military and civilian. We are committed to this effort.

That is why my goal for the Political-Military Bureau at State is to increase the level and depth of understanding between State and Defense of each other’s missions and to strengthen our planning and cooperative efforts. Recently, I wrote a memo to Secretary Albright offering this as the bureau’s primary mission for the year 2000. I know she shares this goal and is committed to making it happen.
The United States was a leader in the effort to create the United Nations and has played a major role in the institution since its founding. The UN Charter was drawn up in San Francisco in 1945, and the UN has had its headquarters in New York City for more than 50 years on land donated to the UN by the Rockefeller family. U.S. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt is credited with coining the term “United Nations.”

As Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recently remarked, “The dream that brought the UN together is as alive today as it has ever been.” The central purposes for which the UN was established — to maintain international peace and security; to foster cooperation in solving international economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems; to promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; to develop friendly relations among nations; and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in attaining common goals — are as important today as they were in the closing days of World War II.

Global interdependence is now a well-established fact of life. Barriers between nations and people are being torn down; trade, technology, people, and ideas cross borders in all regions of the world. Yet as these contacts increase, we are all more vulnerable to each other’s problems. Every day brings potential threats to peace and security, including armed conflict, terrorism, drug trafficking, economic turmoil, disease, weapons of mass destruction, hunger, humanitarian catastrophes, abuses of human rights, and contamination of the natural environment. No nation, powerful or otherwise, can solve these problems alone — or afford to ignore them. The UN serves as an effective, though at times imperfect, means of developing consensus and fostering collaboration. If there were no UN, we would find it considerably more difficult to resolve conflicts peacefully and to build international support for a wide range of important U.S. foreign policy objectives. The UN provides an institutional structure for countries to exchange their views, cooperate on complex tasks, and set standards that reflect common values.

Here are just a few examples of why the work of the UN and other international organizations is important to U.S. foreign policy:

— Peace and Stability: The U.S. — which provides the most peacekeeping funds and the most civilian police, which supports NATO back-up of UN operations, and which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council — plays a leading role in UN efforts to maintain peace, promote democracy, and promote human rights around the world.

— International Security: The U.S. works with other countries through the UN to address threats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, narcotics trafficking, and crime.

— Health and Environmental Concerns: The work of the World Health Organization, Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS, UN Environment Program, and other organizations helps protect people from disease, pollution, global climate change, and other threats.

— Humanitarian Assistance: The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Food Program, and UN Children’s
Fund (UNICEF) are among the UN agencies at the core of the international system for helping people endangered by conflict, natural disasters, hunger, and other threats throughout the world. Of all member states, U.S. contributions to these humanitarian efforts are by far the largest.

— Transportation Safety: Safety and security standards for air and sea transportation are enforced by the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization.

The General Assembly (currently with 189 member states) and the Security Council of the United Nations are the most important international bodies in the world. In no other forum do nations assemble in such quantity and diversity to express their positions and coordinate their efforts.

The U.S. has its most senior diplomat in the field at the UN, with both cabinet rank and substantial responsibility for U.S. foreign policy. Many permanent representatives of member states have served as foreign ministers or other top-level officials of their countries. So in the UN, we are able to transact important international business at the decision-making level.

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The benefits of active U.S. participation and leadership in the UN were clearly in evidence during the Persian Gulf crisis. In 1991, the Security Council proved crucial in developing a broad coalition of large and small nations that acted together in opposition to Saddam Hussein's unprovoked aggression against Kuwait.

More recently, when the U.S. held the rotating presidency of the Security Council in January 2000, Ambassador Holbrooke declared it “The Month of Africa.” He introduced far-reaching initiatives calling on the international community to address long-standing problems of the continent, including the spread of HIV/AIDS, violent ethnic and political conflicts, refugees, hunger, poverty, human rights violations, lack of educational opportunity, and economic marginalization. Top U.S. political leaders, such as the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the chair and members of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee participated in Security Council deliberations during the month. The high-level government interest was mirrored in the U.S. private sector and media.

Americans also hold many leadership positions in the UN itself and in its specialized agencies. These currently include the Under Secretary General for Management and the Executive Directors of two important humanitarian agencies, the World Food Program and UNICEF. We believe it is in our best interests to have well-qualified American citizens serve the UN at all levels, and to be represented on committees that deal with issues of international importance.

Clearly, then, the U.S. government views the UN as an indispensable institution. And American citizens,
representing a wide range of political views, generally support our leadership role in the UN. They recognize that the UN can be central in resolving major international crises and building a more stable world. Some Americans have occasionally expressed fears that the UN may become a “world government” and threaten U.S. sovereignty. These apprehensions are misguided. The UN is a cooperative assembly of sovereign states; it does not and cannot exercise sovereignty over any member state.

Leadership of an institution is demonstrated, in part, by the commitment of financial resources. The U.S. is by far the largest contributor to the UN system, with current annual contributions of well over $2 billion. This includes assessed contributions to the regular UN budget and peacekeeping operations and to the many important UN specialized and affiliated agencies, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization, World Health Organization, International Labor Organization, and International Atomic Energy Agency. The U.S. also provides more than $1 billion annually in voluntary contributions to UN programs in such areas as emergency relief, democracy and human rights, and environmental protection.

Another responsibility of leadership is to ensure that an institution is operated in an efficient, open, and accountable manner. Under the Clinton Administration, the U.S. has led an effort to improve the management and stabilize the finances of the United Nations and its agencies. The U.S. supports the initiatives of the Secretary General to bring about a more transparent, responsive, and consultative approach to management. Recent accomplishments in UN reform include:

- A more disciplined budgeting process, in place of continual growth of the UN budget.

- Establishment of an independent internal inspector general's office, to discover and remedy shortcomings in the administration of UN programs.

- Improvements in the planning and management of peacekeeping operations.

- Significant reductions in unneeded staff positions and in the number of conferences and meetings.

A well-staffed and well-managed UN enables the organization to meet its global challenges more efficiently. These improvements in management, and others that are ongoing, merit the support of all member states.

In late 1999, the U.S. Congress passed, and President Clinton signed into law, legislation designed to enable the U.S. to make overdue payments to the UN and other international organizations. The full amount of this funding is $926 million, which is in addition to our annual assessed and voluntary contributions. In order for the $926 million to be fully paid out, Congress stipulated that certain reform conditions must be met. This has raised some questions and concerns, but the fact is that the U.S. Congress, the elected representatives of the American people, controls the federal budget. The Congress can and does attach conditions to the manner in which U.S. taxpayers' money is spent for domestic programs and for a variety of international activities, including those of the UN.

One of the most important steps that must be taken, we believe, is a revision in the UN scale of assessments; that is, the contributions from member states to the UN budget. These are based on each country's Gross National Product (GNP) as a share of the world's GNP. Reform of the scale of assessments ceiling has not taken place since 1972 and is now long overdue. Since the last adjustment, 55 new member states have joined the UN. There have been significant shifts in members' ability to pay; many countries with fast-growing economies are now capable of increasing their contributions. We need a new scale that reflects today's economic and political realities, a scale in which the cost of supporting the UN is shared somewhat more broadly in the international community.

The United States will continue to play a vital and active role in the United Nations. As a founder, host, and major supporter of the UN, we will continue to work to strengthen the organization and to build international support for needed reforms. Our active participation in the UN reflects our strong commitment to an institution that, in the words of Secretary Albright, “brings nations closer together around basic principles of democracy, liberty, and law that will lift the lives of people everywhere.”
Congress plays a crucial role in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. While the President by necessity takes the lead, the President and the Congress under our Constitution are co-equal branches of government, and the support of Congress on foreign policy is often essential to ensuring that a policy will succeed. If, by contrast, the Congress does not support a President’s policy, or even is lukewarm in its support, it undercuts the policy and limits its success.

The allocation of foreign policy powers is only vaguely sketched in our Constitution. The Senate has the power to approve all treaties negotiated by the President, and must confirm ambassadors and other senior foreign policy officials. Congress retains control over foreign policy funding, and, of course, the power to raise and equip the military, and the power to declare war. But these formal powers serve primarily as a starting point for Congress’s participation. Because of the significance of foreign policy decisions, which often involve the potential for sending U.S. troops into combat, Congress over the years has carved out a more informal “oversight” role, part of the “checks and balances” that are central to the “shared power” among the three branches in our constitutional system.

Besides being largely informal, congressional power in foreign policy is not always exercised with the same degree of intensity. At times of relative peace on the world scene, such as the present, Congress’s involvement can often be modest. At other times, such as during the Persian Gulf war, or during the conflicts in Central America during the 1980s, Congress is likely to get more actively involved, especially if there is significant disagreement with the President over policy.

Congress’s role in approving or disapproving U.S. involvement in overseas military conflicts is the most significant issue at stake when considering the Congress’s foreign policy powers. That is as it should be. The decision to send U.S. troops into harm’s way should never be made by the President alone; the views of the American people should be expressed through their elected representatives in Congress.

Indeed, I believe the Constitution demands it. In my view, the framers of our Constitution intended that Congress authorize any use of force by the United States, with certain limited exceptions.

Congress does not always want to have the responsibility for such momentous decisions, however, and Presidents in the modern era have contended that their power as “Commander in Chief” vested them with unfettered power to take the country to war. Thus did President Truman take the country to war in Korea in 1950. (Although Congress did not formally declare war in the case of Vietnam, arguably it authorized it in the Gulf of Tonkin resolution).

The recent debate about the scope of the war power has yielded perpetual disagreement between the two branches. In 1973, Congress tried to clarify its role by approving, over President Richard Nixon’s veto, the War Powers Resolution, which established a framework for authorizing uses of force, but in any event demanded that a use of force end after 60 days unless Congress
had affirmatively authorized it. But no President since has recognized the authority of this resolution, arguing that it is an unconstitutional limitation on the President’s power as commander in chief. Efforts to modify the resolution to meet these and other concerns have not borne fruit.

As a result of Congressional timidity, and Presidential assertiveness, in recent years Presidents have intervened overseas without an express authorization from Congress. The Persian Gulf war in 1991 was a rare example of Congress authorizing a military operation before it occurred, and only because I and other members of Congress strongly urged a reluctant President Bush to put the matter to a vote. (Bush’s reluctance was borne out when the authorization carried by only a 52-47 vote margin in the Senate.)

More typical were Congress’s deliberations on sending U.S. troops to Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. In all those cases, one or both houses adopted resolutions giving rhetorical support to the U.S. troops and their mission, but Congress did not, in a formal legal sense, authorize the deployment.

Congress’s “power of the purse” is a more reliable means of wielding foreign policy power. Every dollar spent by the Executive Branch must be appropriated by Congress, and it is common practice to use these spending bills to shape policy. Sometimes the process is formal and direct: Congress will stipulate that “no funds shall be used” to carry out a policy or activity that it opposes. On the positive side, it will “earmark” money for a certain program, to make sure the Executive Branch agency carries out its wishes. More often, Congress expresses its views less formally or directly. For example, members of Congress may introduce a bill to cut off funds for a foreign policy activity — Bosnia was an example — even though they know it will never be passed into law. Their point is: show the President that there is disagreement with the policy and perhaps persuade him to abandon the course of action.

Sanctions are a similar tool to express displeasure with a foreign policy; Congress will enact legislation restricting trade or other economic relations with a country whose policies it disagrees with. For example, Congress imposed sanctions on India and Pakistan because of their involvement in drug trafficking. However, the same legislation will often give the President authority to lift the sanctions if he believes it to be in the national interest — which he usually does.

As any visitor to Congress has experienced, another visible means Congress uses to exercise its foreign policy power is through oversight hearings at which officials from the Executive Branch are called before a Congressional committee to explain a policy in a particular area. This is a particularly useful device when Congress has no other appropriate means of influencing policy. By exposing a policy to public scrutiny and debate, hearings can reveal weaknesses in policy, as well as a lack of public support.

The most famous foreign policy hearings in recent memory were the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on Vietnam three decades ago. They were chaired by Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas and televised nationally. By exposing to millions of viewers the contradictions and difficulties of the U.S. effort in Vietnam, the Fulbright hearings were credited with helping to build public opinion against the war.

In similar fashion, the Iran-Contra hearings in 1987 showed the American people the contradictions in the Reagan Administration’s policy of secretly selling arms to Iran — hardly a government friendly to the United States — in order to raise money for the rebels fighting the Communist government in Nicaragua. In the light of day, the policy was insupportable.

In my own experience as a Senator involved with U.S. foreign policy for most of my 28 years in the Senate, the most useful means of influencing U.S. foreign policy is the most informal method — by direct and private discussions with the Secretary of State, the National Security Adviser, and even the President. The President knows he needs to seek support from Congress on any major foreign policy objective, especially if it is controversial. Presidents and their top aides in these instances reach out to senior members of the House and Senate to explain the policy and ask for support. It is in these informal discussions that Congress, through its individual members, probably has the most impact. During last year’s NATO intervention in Kosovo, for example, I had almost daily private consultations with key members of the administration. This allowed me
not only to follow the progress of the war closely, but also to critique the policy and suggest alternative courses of action.

Unlike in parliamentary systems, where the executive has almost unchallenged authority on overseas matters, the American constitutional system allows for a significant Congressional role in foreign policy. That role is not exercised through any one means, and the degree of Congressional involvement varies from time to time, depending on how contentious a policy has become. Despite the ambiguities and the uncertainties about Congress's role, even Presidents realize the importance of having Congress as a partner in the conduct of foreign policy. With Congressional support, they know they that will be more confident and effective and that the American people will be behind them.
It has been said that the United States Constitution is “an invitation to struggle” among the three branches of government — the executive, the legislative, and the judiciary. This has certainly been the case in national security policy where the President and Congress have overlapping roles.

The Constitution declares the President to be the commander in chief and the nation’s chief diplomat. In these capacities, he is responsible for the military defense of our national interests, including the deployment of U.S. military forces, and diplomacy, including the negotiation of treaties.

But the Constitution also grants Congress very significant national security powers. The Senate is responsible for the ratification of treaties and the confirmation of individuals nominated by the President to fill key posts in his administration. Congress also is granted significant “powers of the purse.” By using its authorities over the federal budget, Congress can, and often does, check and balance presidential initiatives.

These overlapping powers make it important for the President to respect the views of Congress and to robustly engage often varied views on foreign policy that exist in the Senate and the House of Representatives. This is, of course, a more challenging undertaking when the President and the majority in one or both congressional chambers are of different parties — but such situations make engagement all the more imperative. The success or failure of our international policies depends upon the leadership of the President, namely whether or not he is concerned more with politics than with policy.

The recent extension of membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary is perhaps the best example of how a President should lead and engage the Congress on matters concerning major international treaties.

NATO enlargement was first promoted by the Republican-led Congress, which facilitated what some experts have called unprecedented dialogue and information-sharing between the two branches. That engagement occurred not only through formal hearings of the Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Appropriations, and Budget Committees, but also through countless informal meetings and conversations between Members of Congress and senior administration officials in the course of the two years leading up to the April 1999 vote.

Moreover, both the Senate and the President took institutional steps to deepen their engagement on NATO enlargement. In April 1997 the Senate leadership established the Senate NATO Observer Group to help ensure that the chamber was fully abreast of and involved in key decisions before the NATO alliance. Foremost on its agenda was NATO enlargement. On this issue, the NATO Observer Group met some 17 times, not only with administration officials, but also with NATO’s Secretary General and numerous other European officials.

The administration established its own special office, the NATO Enlargement Ratification Office, led by a special adviser to the President. His mandate was to promote the cause of enlargement both in Congress and among the American people. At the recommendation of the Enlargement Ratification Office, the President included representatives of the Senate NATO Observer...
Group in his delegations to the 1997 and 1999 NATO summits.

The Senate’s historic April 30, 1999 vote (80-19) ratifying the first round of NATO enlargement was a model of how a President and Congress should work together on matters of foreign policy. Policy took precedence over politics, and the final outcome was a success because of it.

In contrast, the Senate’s rejection of the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) highlighted the risks a President takes when he loses sight of Congress’s responsibility and authority under the Constitution and addresses key matters through the lens of politics rather than policy.

The Clinton Administration did not lead the effort on CTBT in the same way it did during the NATO enlargement debate. It did not take opportunities to prepare for the debate or engage Congress on CTBT with the same energy and commitment it had dedicated to NATO enlargement, leaving Congress to fill the vacuum created by a breakdown of executive leadership on the issue. Some Congressional leaders had been critical of the CTBT’s enforcement and verification provisions and its potential impact upon our nuclear arsenal. Knowing of these concerns, the President should have been more engaged and resolved the concerns of Republican senators or, at a minimum, restrained Democratic senators from baiting and inciting the Republican leadership.

Unfortunately, the issue of an important treaty fell victim to runaway politics, personal animus, and immovable ideologues in the Senate and the White House. The worldwide fallout from the failure of CTBT cast unnecessary doubt on the United States, its government, and especially its Congress, showing that foreign policy-making is one of the most important duties of the Congress, having some of the most far-reaching implications.

The Clinton Administration’s handling of, and the Congressional response to, the CTBT ratification effort was a disappointment in two regards. First, the Treaty would have helped curb the risks posed by nuclear weapons and preserved for the United States the moral standing to resist the proliferation of such weaponry. Second, the administration’s approach to the Senate’s CTBT reservations regarding verification and enforcement defied the tradition of bipartisanship with which most Congressmen and Presidents have approached key issues of foreign policy.

This Treaty’s defeat not only reminds us of Congress’s powerful constitutional authorities in foreign policy, it also underscores an important development in the making of U.S. foreign policy: the increasingly important role of Congress. Today, Congress is more vigorously exercising its prerogatives and promoting its perspectives on issues of national security, often in direct challenge to the President. Indeed, it was Congress that pressed successfully against the President’s initial hesitancy on NATO enlargement and national missile defense. It successfully forced the President to adjust his approach to the Chemical Weapons Convention. It has vociferously challenged presidential initiatives, such as the NATO missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

The partisanship demonstrated during the CTBT debate must not be allowed to emerge as a trend in the making of U.S. foreign policy. Such a development would make it more difficult to work with allies and to deter our enemies abroad. We would be less capable of marshaling our national strengths to promote and protect our values and interests. America’s ability to lead with initiative in world affairs would be hampered by domestic political gridlock. It would be more difficult for the President and Congress to live up to their shared responsibilities of promoting and protecting our national interests and values.

For these reasons, the partisan tremors that permeated the President’s handling of the CTBT should leave us remembering the responsibilities and the powers that the Constitution provides to the President and the Congress. These powers were intended to foster a relationship out of which would emerge debated and dissected policies and processes that reflect the good of our government, not the bad.

Effective foreign policy requires a genuine and continuous bipartisan engagement between the President and Congress. Without such engagement, the content of U.S. policy will be characterized increasingly by ambiguity and inconsistency.

Fostering a foreign policy consensus between Congress and the President is, for constitutional reasons
primarily, the responsibility of the White House. It is the President’s role as commander in chief and chief diplomat that makes him the leader of our foreign policy.

Fostering engagement, however, between the White House and Congress on matters of foreign policy is also the responsibility of Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives. Congress can and should undertake initiatives to foster dialogue, information-sharing, and engagement with the President and his cabinet on key matters of national concern, such as seen with NATO enlargement. The failure of CTBT has shown that such bipartisanship must not be taken for granted. As these episodes demonstrate, the success of American foreign policy depends upon the successful engagement of the President and the Congress in their constitutional duties.
The key challenge for the United States in foreign economic policy is to use America's great influence to maintain an open and prosperous global economy and deepen and extend the benefits of globalization. Inherent in this challenge is also the opportunity to have a great impact on America's capacity to meet its political, strategic, and humanitarian foreign policy goals. The evolution of the global economy will affect our national security, the spread of democracy and human rights, the environment, terrorism, illegal drug trade, organized crime, health and disease, population pressures, and most other major international challenges.

American strategic interests are now tightly intertwined with U.S. economic interests. Economic issues greatly affect our relationships with the other great powers: Europe, Japan, China, and Russia. They proliferate on the U.S. foreign policy agenda, from NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and fast track legislation to the Asian financial crisis and Chinese entrance into the WTO (World Trade Organization). U.S. economic sanctions against Cuba, Iran, and Libya have been a source of major contention with some of our closest allies. There are few foreign policy threats on the horizon as great as a world financial meltdown.

Globalization is the preeminent international economic phenomenon of our time. American prosperity is inextricably linked to global prosperity. The volume and pace of international trade and investment are increasing tremendously. Communications and information technologies are transforming the way the world does business, and connecting people and firms as never before. The integration of the production and marketing of goods and services across international borders is changing the structure of the private sector. New international mergers, networks, and alliances are emerging daily.

Globalization brings with it both benefits and costs, opportunities and challenges. The overall economic impact of globalization has been positive, producing gains in productivity, efficiency, and growth. Globalization has played a major role in the remarkable economic expansion our country has enjoyed over the past nine years, and has contributed to rapid economic growth in parts of Asia, Europe, and Latin America. It holds the promise of bringing great benefits to people all around the globe.

Yet globalization also spawns many problems. The increased competition of globalization means that some people, and some countries, lag behind. Globalization can lead to reduced protection for workers and the environment when companies move their operations to jurisdictions with weaker labor and environmental standards. Global capital markets can be dangerously volatile. Political authority and international institutions sometimes struggle to keep up with the fast-paced economic trends. Developing nations are frustrated that they do not participate more fully in international economic decision-making and the prosperity enjoyed by other parts of the world.

Despite these problems created by globalization, we cannot, and should not, try to turn it back. The trend toward increasing integration among the economies of the world will likely continue.
The United States has a historic opportunity to lead the charge to meet the challenges of globalization and thereby help create a more prosperous, peaceful, and democratic world. How should we use our political and economic power to spread the benefits of the global economy and advance many of our other foreign policy goals?

First, we should continue to set an example of prosperity by maintaining a strong domestic economy. The success of our economy encourages other countries to pursue liberalization, free trade, and other policies conducive to growth. The American public and private sectors can spur technological innovation, promote exports, and help maintain our position as a leader in science and information technology by investing heavily in research and development. Our lead in these industries of the future represents one of our greatest foreign policy assets.

Second, we should vigorously promote free markets and open trade, while developing more effective international economic institutions. Reductions in barriers to trade promote growth, advance the integration of national economies, and foster international political cooperation. Yet free trade also creates problems, which effective international institutions can help resolve. We should strengthen the World Trade Organization by making it more accountable, transparent, and inclusive of a wide range of economic concerns. We should also build a stronger international financial architecture able to prevent crises and respond to them.

Third, we should invest in sustainable development, education, and promoting the rule of law in poorer countries and in countries making a transition to free markets and democracy. It is important that globalization not be seen by many as a phenomenon imposed by economic elites on the rest of the world’s population without offering any protection or assistance to them. To help spread globalization’s benefits, we should provide economic assistance and debt relief to those countries committed to responsible economic policies, support exchange programs that bring foreign students and future leaders to the United States and send Americans to other countries, and help train foreign judges, lawyers, and leaders of civil society so that the rule of law and accountable government are strengthened. All of these activities promote our foreign policy goals of advancing prosperity, democracy, and international economic and political cooperation.

One region of the world where U.S. economic policy can have a potentially broader foreign policy impact is Africa. Poverty and underdevelopment are certainly not the only problems facing that continent. But economic growth is essential to boosting African living standards and successfully confronting Africa’s political, security, and health challenges over the long term.

Currently, much of Africa lacks the modern infrastructure and resources necessary to take advantage of globalization. The United States can help remedy these deficiencies by providing well-targeted foreign aid, debt relief, technical assistance, loans, and a more open market for African goods. American companies could reap substantial profits from investments in the development of modern communications and transportation systems in Africa if the right political climate and backing were in place. Public and private sector partnerships offer the best hope for improving the living standards of Africans and advancing U.S. political, security, and economic interests in Africa.

The international political and economic environment has changed during the past several decades, and the evolution of the U.S. foreign policy-making process has been influenced by that transition.

When I first entered Congress 35 years ago, U.S. foreign policy was dominated by the single goal of defeating the communist threat. Policy was made by a small circle of people, including the President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security Advisor, and a few others. International economic issues were considered only peripherally, or as a subordinate element of broader geopolitical concerns.

Today, U.S. foreign policy deals with a wide array of issues, from terrorism and illegal drugs to the environment and sustainable development. Congress is much more involved in the policy process. And economics have become more central to our foreign policy than ever before.

The process of making foreign economic policy is more diffuse today. The number of actors in the policy process has grown tremendously and now includes many executive branch agencies and congressional committees, as well as trade groups, non-profit organizations, international organizations, and universities. In the executive branch, the locus of government activity on
foreign economic policy can shift among the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, Energy, and Agriculture, and the U.S. Trade Representative, to name just a few of the agencies involved. On IMF (International Monetary Fund) funding and the Asian financial crisis, for instance, Treasury has played the leading role.

In Congress, dozens of committees and ad hoc caucuses now influence the development of foreign economic policy. The president can no longer consult with only the leadership in Congress and be assured of congressional support for a presidential initiative. On the issue of economic sanctions against India and Pakistan, for instance, the India Caucus and members of Congress with strong agriculture interests in their districts have exerted great influence.

Many special interest groups, particularly business and labor organizations, have a substantial impact on U.S. policy. On fast track, permanent normal trade relations with China, and many other issues, advocacy groups have taken center stage. They have a greater impact today because more Americans recognize that they are affected by foreign economic policy. Exports — from aviation to information technology to entertainment — are a growing sector of the economy. The livelihood of American businesses and workers is heavily shaped by trade agreements and economic developments around the world.

The United States needs a coherent and unified policy-making apparatus to promote the kind of multifaceted foreign economic policy that today's complex international environment demands. It is appropriate for many agencies and congressional committees to be involved in foreign economic policy on issues that clearly affect their interests. But we must ensure that our overall national interests are considered first and foremost in the development of our policy. The State Department and the main foreign policy congressional committees should maintain a central role in these areas of policy-making.

The growing importance of economic issues in foreign policy offers new opportunities to the State Department. While the United States will continue to rely on State's traditional skills of overseas political and economic reporting and diplomatic negotiation, the United States also will benefit from proficiency in linking America's broad political and security interests to the trends and challenges of globalization. As many people inside and outside the U.S. government have already come to recognize, the American national interests in international politics, economics, and security simply cannot be properly understood or dealt with in isolation.

I am confident that the American people and U.S. policy-makers will continue to support a foreign policy that promotes free trade and growth, advances international economic integration, and encourages the spread of democracy and the rule of law. Such a foreign policy bolsters our own economic health and contributes to the making of a more peaceful and prosperous world.
When people think of foreign policy-making in the United States, they usually think of the president. After all, presidents have been the chief architects and implementers of American foreign policy since the beginning of the republic. The framers of the U.S. Constitution were mindful of the advantages that the presidency brought to this endeavor: a hierarchical institution with a single head, the one institution that would be in continuous tenure, and the one that could act with the greatest “energy, dispatch, and responsibility,” to quote James Wilson, one of the delegates at the Constitutional Convention.

But the framers also were fearful of arbitrary and irresponsible actions by a chief executive, such as the ones they attributed to King George III and cited as a cause of the American Revolution. To reduce the likelihood that a president might engage in activities that would be harmful to the national interest, the Constitution imposed checks on a range of executive powers, particularly those of war and peace. Treaties were subject to Senate ratification by a two-thirds vote, while executive appointments, including those of ambassadors, required concurrence by a majority of the Senate. Also vested in Congress was the authority to regulate foreign commerce; declare war; raise, maintain, and make rules for a standing army and navy; call up the militia, and appropriate money for the operations of government and conduct of foreign policy.

Divided powers require institutional cooperation to formulate public policy. That is why the framers sought to establish the Senate, the smaller of the two legislative houses, as an advisory body to assist the president in making foreign policy. Both the treaty-making and appointment provisions require the Senate’s “advice and consent.” However, when the country’s first president, George Washington, tried to seek the Senate’s advice on a treaty that his administration wished to negotiate with native peoples who lived in the western part of the state of Georgia, he found the Senate slow to respond and members’ advice insipid at best. Instead of returning to the Senate for foreign policy recommendations, Washington turned instead to the principal heads of his executive departments, a group James Madison termed the president’s cabinet. The term stuck, and so did the practice of using the cabinet as an advisory body for foreign and domestic affairs.

Beginning with Washington, presidents became the chief foreign policy-makers and their secretaries of state their principal advisers and administrators for that policy. The Senate continued to ratify treaties, but presidents rarely sought its institutional advice. Nonetheless, about 70 percent of the treaties they submitted to the Senate gained ratification with little or no modification.

Throughout the 19th century and into the 20th, presidents dominated the foreign policy-making process. They received ambassadors, recognized countries, and entered into agreements, short of formal treaties, with their executive counterparts in other countries. As commanders in chief, presidents also positioned armed forces to defend American lives and interests. President Thomas Jefferson ordered the Navy and Marines to retaliate against the Barbary pirates, who threatened American shipping. President James Polk directed the Army into disputed territory with
Mexico to reinforce what Texans considered to be their rightful border. President Abraham Lincoln called up the militia and instituted a blockade of the South. Congress could have opposed these presidential actions but chose not to do so. When a policy was unsuccessful, however, members of Congress felt free to condemn it, as they often did. Only in the areas of trade and tariffs did Congress play an active policy-setting role.

The country’s involvement in the international arena began to expand at the beginning of the 20th century during the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Both presidents designed new international initiatives for the United States, and both used their “bully pulpit” to try to rally public support for them. Roosevelt succeeded in obtaining approval to build the Panama Canal, but Wilson failed to obtain ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, which ended World War I, and for U.S. participation in the League of Nations.

Nonetheless, a broad presidential prerogative in foreign affairs had been firmly established. In 1936 the Supreme Court acknowledged this prerogative in the case of *The United States vs. Curtiss-Wright Corporation*, ruling that the president possessed implied and inherent constitutional authority to conduct foreign affairs, whereas in the domestic sphere the policy-making responsibilities were clearly vested in the Congress.

The distinction between foreign and domestic policy-making continued for another three decades. The United States’ entry into World War II, followed by the Cold War, led to and continued a crisis atmosphere which encouraged Congress to follow the president’s lead. During this period, politics was said to stop at the water’s edge. Bipartisan cooperation characterized foreign policy-making until the end of the 1960s.

The Vietnam War put an end to this institutional and partisan cooperation. Angered by false and misleading statements and promises made by Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon, disillusioned by the loss of American lives and the deepening military involvement, and moved by increasing criticism at home, Congress resisted presidential policy that prolonged and expanded the war. In 1971, legislation was enacted to restrict the use of government money to extend the war into neighboring Southeast Asian countries; two years later Congress passed the War Powers Resolution over President Nixon’s veto to give the House and the Senate a larger voice in the decision to go to war. During the 1980s, Congress also limited the president’s expenditure of funds, this time in Central America. It was the violation of this policy by officials of the Reagan administration that led to the Iran-Contra scandal involving the sale of arms to Iran and diversion of profits from the sale to the Contras in Nicaragua, and resulted in criminal charges being brought against two national security aides who broke the law.

The increased involvement of Congress in foreign policy-making was more than simply a reaction to the unpopular Vietnam War, however. Changes within the institutional, political, and informational environments also were responsible for expanding interest in foreign policy matters, the pool of foreign policy participants, and sources of information and expertise needed to make foreign policy judgments.

The institutional changes decentralized power. In Congress, the committee system, dominated by the senior members of the party that controlled the legislative body, was deemed too autocratic and exclusionary by younger and newly elected members of Congress who were anxious to get into the action. In 1974 they staged a mini-revolution to reduce the power of committee chairs and disperse it to rank-and-file members. A standing subcommittee system was established in which each subcommittee was headed by a different representative of the majority party. Not only were more members of Congress involved in foreign policy-making, but a much larger congressional staff system, needed to support this committee expansion, also was created. The staff provided Congress with the information and expertise it needed to legislate, and for which it had been previously dependent on the executive branch, thereby increasing the legislature’s ability to act on its own.

Executive branch activities expanded as well. U.S. entry into World War II and subsequent developments during the Cold War led to greater responsibilities for the State and Defense Departments. In addition, separate aid and information agencies were created (although the U.S. Information Agency has recently been incorporated into the State Department), new intelligence agencies were established, and an Energy
Department came into being, in part to oversee the growing number of atomic and nuclear programs and facilities. Today, all of the executive departments have divisions that deal with the international aspects of their missions. To coordinate and monitor these efforts, presidents have expanded their own Executive Office. They have created a trade office to negotiate agreements, established economic and national security policy councils to proffer and coordinate advice, and used the Office of Management and Budget to oversee policy-making and implementation.

In addition to the institutional reforms, divided partisan control of government contributed to the closer scrutiny that Congress gave to presidential foreign policy initiatives and matters of implementation. The party that controlled one or both houses of Congress, but not the White House, gained political advantage from investigating irregularities, mismanagement, and failures in the conduct of foreign policy by the executive branch. These investigations included the failed rescue attempt of American diplomats held hostage in Iran during the Carter administration, the sale of arms to Iran and diversion of profits from the sale to the Contras in Nicaragua (the Reagan administration), U.S. inaction in the failed coup attempt in Panama (the Bush administration), and the loss of American lives during the humanitarian mission in Somalia and the sale of satellite missile technology to China (the Clinton administration). Naturally the news media highlighted these investigations, giving members of Congress, particularly those of the opposition party, the publicity they desired.

A more investigatory and negative press also reported more and in greater depth on executive implementation problems, policy disagreements within the administration and between it and Congress, and issues that generated international conflict and domestic discord. Moreover, technological changes within the communications media have forced more and more decision-making into the public arena and media spotlight, thereby shortening time frames for decisions and making quiet compromise more difficult.

Other political developments have had an equally profound impact on the greater openness and accessibility of foreign policy-making. Single issue interest groups have proliferated, professionalized, and now regularly promote their policy goals within the legislative and executive arenas. The explosion of group activity has been particularly evident in the foreign policy realm, which had been relatively free of strong, broad-based group pressures. Add to these multiple and increasingly powerful organizations a much larger pool of academic and policy experts in foreign and military affairs who go in and out of government and who also represent many international interests, and one sees how much more open, accessible, and prominent the foreign policy arena has become in the United States. Today most multinational companies, some large foreign-owned companies, and even foreign governments hire Americans with legislative and executive experience and “contacts” to represent them on pending issues in which they have an interest.

The involvement of so many people and groups has helped obliterate the distinction between domestic and foreign policy. In fact, a new word, “intermestic” is now used to describe policy that impacts on both international and domestic issues.

Although the president remains the principal initiator of American foreign policy, there are now more relevant players, more issues, and more pressures. Foreign policy has become more people's business, debated and conducted for the most part by more people with substantive training and experience in foreign affairs from both the public and private sectors. Nor does politics stop at the water's edge as it used to. Today partisan and institutional politics pervade practically all aspects of foreign policy-making.

This decentralization of foreign policy-making in the United States reflects the growth of the U.S. government and its increasing accessibility to outside interests. It also testifies to America's expanding international concerns, to the interdependency of world economies, the growth of political and cultural internationalism, and the overlapping of social interests from human rights to the environment, from nutrition and health to child labor, from the Internet to genetic engineering and hormonal research. The world has gotten smaller and more complex. The distinction between foreign and domestic as well as the one between national and international has become blurred. As a consequence, the pressures and players have multiplied as has the politics.
FOREIGN POLICY-MAKERS RELY ON THE ADVICE PROVIDED BY NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOs) TO HELP ENSURE THAT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY REFLECTS THE VIEWS AND IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, SAYS JULIA TAFt. ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR POPULATION, REFUGEES AND MIGRATION. TAFt SAYS THAT “IF AN ISSUE RESONATES WITH A NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION COMMUNITY — WHICH IS REALLY A COMMUNITY OF CONSCIENCE — AND THE NGOs USE THEIR INTERNATIONAL AFFILIATES AND CONTACTS, THE IMPACT IS FELT NOT ONLY IN U.S. POLICY, BUT IN EUROPE AND THROUGHOUT OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD.” SHE WAS INTERVIEWED BY CONTRIBUTING EDITOR SUSAN ELLIS.

Question: How would you assess the impact of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the making of U.S. foreign policy?

TafT: There are over a million NGOs in the United States representing various religious faiths, cultural groups, environmental organizations, social service groups, and business associations. A non-governmental organization is any non-profit, voluntary citizens’ group which is organized on a local, national or international level, task-oriented, and driven by people with a common interest. We are able to reach out to these groups for advice and my sense is that they have a very significant impact on our foreign policy. Because we are a democracy, foreign policy-makers solicit the views and ideas of NGO representatives to help ensure that U.S. foreign policy reflects a broad spectrum of the interests of the American people.

Q: What are the key factors that have led to the growing size and influence of NGOs around the world?

TafT: In some countries, we are seeing an absolute explosion of non-governmental organizations. I remember reading recently that in one African country alone there were 20,000 non-governmental organizations. Many of these were local self-help groups, just like many NGOs that started in the United States.

So, the number of NGOs is growing because people need to have control over some part of their lives. We see in the developing world non-governmental organizations trying to make decisions about common issues that affect their members in order to help them to improve their lives.

And in places where there is no well-organized government infrastructure, the NGOs themselves often play a role in self-government. So there’s a real growth of NGOs, even in societies that are not accustomed to them, like the states of the former Soviet Union.

Q: In what ways do NGOs work with the State Department and other U.S. government entities in the area of foreign policy?

TafT: The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has a formal advisory council on voluntary foreign aid. It has been in existence since the early 1950s, and it provides a way for private organizations and individuals to learn more about U.S. government assistance programs and to advise on their direction.

There is also an advisory council made up of NGOs that has regular dialogues with the State Department on economic policy.

In the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, which I head, we spend about a third of our time meeting with non-governmental organizations. They are very much partners with us in the provision of international relief assistance to refugees, as well as in assisting in resettling refugees in the United States.

In addition, there is a very active group of population and family planning organizations that have been
extremely helpful to both the U.S. government and the United Nations in crafting plans of action and documents on what the world ought to be doing about making family planning more accessible.

There also are environmental groups, and now we have women’s groups that are working on Beijing Plus-Five, the follow-up to the Beijing Women’s Conference in 1995, which will be part of the UN General Assembly’s agenda in June.

Q: Do you think the State Department is doing a good job building global partnership with NGOs? What are some success stories?

TAFT: I think the best example is where we actually work together in the field, and that is in refugee relief programs. We have staff that are assigned to work with refugees and with the NGOs and the UN agencies, and we have become really inseparable partners as we all try to work toward saving the lives of refugees.

We are also having very good success in the environmental field where NGOs regularly work with the State Department on international environmental policies, global warming, and similar issues.

There is also the extraordinary success story of the 1999 Cairo-Plus-Five Review document, which outlines progress and challenges in implementing the program of action that emerged from the International Conference on Population and Development held in Cairo in 1994. We worked with scores of NGOs throughout 1999 while drafting the Review, and they were extremely helpful in the negotiation of the document.

Q: In what areas have NGOs had the most influence?

TAFT: Two examples often are used to illustrate how really important NGOs are. One is the moratorium on commercial whaling imposed by the International Whaling Commission. The moratorium followed an international effort involving like-minded governments working with U.S. NGOs and their regional counterparts all over the world to reduce the killing of whales in order to preserve and protect the whale population.

That same technique was used on the issue of banning anti-personnel landmines, where key international organizations and NGOs worked together, mostly through a Web site. They devised an e-mail system that extended throughout the world in an attempt to enlist signers of petitions, to develop a meaningful message, and to work on strategy. That landmine ban initiative totally revolutionized the way much of the world thinks about landmines, including the need to deal with victims of mines as well as to ban anti-personnel mines.

Those two examples demonstrate that if an issue resonates with a broad non-governmental organization community — which is really a community of conscience — and the NGOs use their international affiliates and contacts, the impact is felt not only in U.S. policy, but in Europe and throughout other parts of the world. Governments will sit up and listen because this is the voice of the people.

In the humanitarian field, as I indicated earlier, NGOs have a very large influence on the selection and numbers of people who will be admitted annually to the United States for refugee resettlement.

The United States is by far the world’s most generous recipient of refugees for permanent resettlement. We take about 50 percent of all refugees who are referred by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees for permanent resettlement around the world. And we have done this because, of course, our own country was founded by refugees, so this is part of our national character.

Every year about eight percent of the U.S. immigration quota is set aside for refugees. The U.S. government helps financially, but it is the voluntary agencies — working with the Congress, the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and communities throughout the United States — that are responsible for resettling each refugee.

This year, for instance, our admissions level is 85,000. All of those 85,000 refugees who come to the United States will be processed by voluntary agencies before proceeding to communities throughout the country. That has led us to listen very carefully to the recommendations of these NGOs and to see if we can meet their requested levels for admissions. If it weren’t for their support, their advocacy, their understanding,
I don't think we would have a solid refugee resettlement program in this country.

That being said, we have a long way to go in other aspects of foreign policy. Much of the work of foreign policy has a dimension of national security, and therefore there is less willingness to open the dialogue to people who don't have security clearances, people who are not affiliated with government.

And so, there are many issues that we address in the State Department which, unfortunately, do not have the benefit of broad debate, broad exploration, and ideas from NGOs.

My field involves global issues which have less secrecy attached to them. But I think we, as a department, need to do much more to systematically open up our minds and our ideas. We need to vet them with people who, although they are outside government, often have a very good sense of what works and what the problems are.

Q: What are the key tools used by NGOs to influence foreign policy-making?

TAFT: You'll see picketing. You'll see Web sites. Many NGOs have campaigns on issues. They all have newsletters. They all have boards of directors whose members are influential in their communities, and there are those that are an association of associations, bringing together NGOs with similar interests to form a coalition.

The largest one of that type working internationally is called InterAction, which is the group I headed before coming to the State Department. What we did to get our message out was to work very closely with all of the member organizations on the two or three messages we wanted to tell Congress that year. And all of us needed to tell Congress the same message.

While I was president of InterAction, one of the messages we sought to convey was that the United States needed to increase its foreign assistance, that the American people supported the concept of foreign aid.

We started what was known as the One Percent Campaign, aimed at explaining that less than one cent of every tax dollar goes to foreign affairs. And it really started grabbing hold. It was four years ago that we started that campaign. Unfortunately, all of the buttons and brochures that we developed at InterAction on that campaign I could use today, because foreign affairs is still less than one cent of the U.S. tax dollar.

Q: Do you routinely solicit the input of NGOs as you develop policy related to population, refugees, and migration? If so, what means do you use to do so?

TAFT: We often send out faxes to interested people saying, “Here’s what we’re thinking about. If you have any ideas, get in touch with us.” And we use the forum of meetings in the State Department on a regular basis. For people who can’t get here, for organizations that can’t come, we talk by phone.

Q: Are there any reasons to discourage the influence of NGOs on U.S. decision-making?

TAFT: They are made up of citizens, and they are entitled to be heard. And that’s what we try to do. However, the government must retain the right to evaluate and decide on the advice it receives. Sometimes if NGOs do not like what they hear from policy-makers, they might oppose the policy and go to Congress or to the press. But I feel that we have benefited greatly by having a regular dialogue. We don’t always agree on everything, but we certainly — at least in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration — have been able to maintain a very solid constituency for what we are trying to do, in part because we have been informed by the NGOs’ experiences and their ideas.

Q: How can NGOs be more effective in their efforts to influence foreign policy?

TAFT: We try to broaden the debate to groups with a variety of views. Very seldom are people really comfortable with bringing in opposing groups without a balance. So almost all meetings have people who represent a broad spectrum of opinions. In that way, we don't just get one viewpoint that we're comfortable with, or one viewpoint that's totally opposed to what we want.

Q: How does the U.S. government balance the views of NGOs and other interest groups so as not to give undue weight to any one group in its foreign policy decision-making?

TAFT: We try to broaden the debate to groups with a variety of views. Very seldom are people really comfortable with bringing in opposing groups without a balance. So almost all meetings have people who represent a broad spectrum of opinions. In that way, we don't just get one viewpoint that we're comfortable with, or one viewpoint that's totally opposed to what we want.

Q: How can NGOs be more effective in their efforts to influence foreign policy?
TAFT: It seems to me that the real challenge for NGOs is to work much more extensively with their counterparts in other parts of the world, making sure that they are maintaining a dialogue, and that they are being informed about what the particular concerns and issues are in other countries. In that way, when we hear from our NGOs, they understand and can put into context their counterparts’ concerns, and they can advise us about them.

I see the emergence of more of these kinds of networks of U.S. NGOs and their foreign counterparts. USAID has spent quite a number of years and dollars to help in the creation of NGOs in the developing world and in the former Soviet Union. But I think U.S. NGOs need to be very closely attuned to grassroots NGOs in other countries in order to make sure that we understand the needs of the people in countries that receive U.S. aid.

Q: What do you think can be done to raise the level or frequency of dialogues between key NGOs in the foreign affairs community and the State Department?

TAFT: Every regional, functional, or policy bureau in the State Department develops its own Strategic Plan — a well thought-out document that outlines the main issues of concern, prioritizes them, and details how certain kinds of objectives will be achieved. I would love to see us open up a process early in that strategic planning program to test whether or not the objectives we think are important are also important to a mixture of non-governmental organizations.

We need to get think tanks involved. We need to get business and labor groups involved. We need to solicit input from any group that has a stake in international affairs. I think we could do this through Town Meetings. We probably could do something through Web sites where we would create some interactive process and say, “If you are really interested in this issue, these are some of the things we are thinking about. If you have ideas, just let us know.”

We might find out that there is a great deal of interest. It has to be efficient, because we don’t have the time or the people to devote to extensive consultations. But with new technology and an open attitude, it seems to me we ought to be able to do something.

Q: Where would you like to see the NGOs’ role enhanced?

TAFT: We need not be timid in reaching out to these organizations, and our public outreach should be a two-way street. We want to tell them what we’re doing, but we also need to get their reactions, discover what their priorities are.

Public opinion polling is sometimes very important to inform us about the priorities in the countries that we’re dealing with. We need to constantly remind ourselves that policy evolves; it is not set in concrete. We think the world is pretty dynamic and that we need to be receptive to ideas about how to improve, how to articulate what it is we do in a better way.

Q: How do NGOs affect the U.S. role and involvement in international organizations such as the UN and NATO?

TAFT: The NGOs are strong partners with many of the UN specialized agencies, and particularly the humanitarian agencies. The UN Family Planning Association works with and through NGOs all over the world in its programs. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees works with and through over 400 NGOs to be able to provide relief and assistance to refugees. So there’s a strong relationship operationally.

At major UN global meetings — including the Cairo Conference on Population and Development, the Beijing Women’s Conference, and the Rio Summit on the environment — the role of non-governmental organizations has been absolutely pivotal in helping to develop the plans of action, trying to raise global attention to the issue, and also providing advice and support on the best way to move the issue forward in the international arena.

The thousands of people representing NGOs from all over the world in those conferences are the same people who will maintain the advocacy, the awareness, the follow-up from those conferences all over the world. And I think that’s great.

Q: Do NGOs have a role to play in the way governments interact with each other?
Taft: I think their role is more in making their respective governments receptive to the kinds of policies that other countries will be proposing and in gaining their support for them.

Let me give you an example:

We are going to be introducing a resolution on China at the UN Human Rights Commission. We have been talking with all of the member governments of the commission about this China Resolution, and, at the same time, Tibetan organizations around the world are going to their governments saying, “We want you to support this resolution.” We think it’s good for governments to hear not only from us on such issues, but from their own people as well.

So human rights groups are involved in laying the groundwork for most of the resolutions in the UN Human Rights Commission by influencing their governments to do the right thing when they go to Geneva. The NGOs’ basic responsibility in this area is in setting the climate, establishing priorities, and letting their governments know that there is a political will of the people on whatever the issue is.
The dawn of the 21st century finds the United States deeply involved in the outside world, more so than ever before in its history, and, in terms of the reach of its global engagement, more so than any other country. It has diplomatic relations with about 180 sovereign states; its military forces are deployed, in large measure or small, throughout the world; its role in the global economy is unmatched and is made manifest, in some degree, in virtually every other country; and it belongs to a host of international institutions. Other nations look to the United States for leadership, for help in providing for their security and prosperity, for diplomacy in preventing war and making peace, and for wisdom in shaping the work of international bodies that cover a wide range of human activity.

The United States makes and carries out its foreign policy — more correctly, its many foreign policies — through a number of government entities that bring to bear their different and often contending perspectives. They range from the staff of the president in the White House to the Departments of State, Defense, and Treasury, several intelligence agencies, and a few dozen other departments and agencies that have a direct impact both on determining what the United States does abroad and then in carrying out the government’s decisions.

Furthermore, the United States Congress has its own foreign policy responsibilities, some mandated by the U.S. Constitution, some by law, and others by custom. Nor is the Congress simply a passive reflection of the will of the American president although, in much of U.S. foreign and security policy, he is usually pre-eminent. All activities of the administration require congressional funding. Through a large number of committees, it sifts through the proposals, programs, and performance of U.S. foreign policy and brings under close scrutiny what each department and agency does abroad. Perhaps in no other country does the legislative arm of government have such a major role, often in opposition to the will of the president, in trying to shape American policy toward the outside world.

This role for Congress demonstrates the importance for any president of gaining popular support for the administration’s foreign and national security policies. This is particularly important among opinion leaders throughout the country, in order to ensure that there is a solid basis of domestic support for U.S. activities abroad. While a president is often given the benefit of the doubt in foreign policy, this is not automatic or assured. Nor has the U.S. role in the world been so constant — or so determined by a limited range of factors, as is the case in many other countries whose attentions are focused on immediate neighbors or their own region — that there is widespread popular understanding, over time, of the proper U.S. course in the world.

Also in the United States, as in other countries, political leaders come and go, and the directions of foreign policy can be deeply affected by the outcome of elections — both for president and for members of the Senate and House of Representatives. But perhaps in no other democratic country does the election of a new president and change of administrations mean such a wholesale change of leading officials, in foreign policy...
and national security as well as in domestic areas of policy. Especially when the presidency is transferred from one political party to the other, virtually all senior officials are replaced, to a significant depth in the bureaucracy, so that the conduct of foreign policy suddenly comes into the hands of people who do not have immediate experience of the problems and challenges that the nation faces. It is often a few months before the new team is fully in charge, even if the incoming president appoints his new officials rapidly, as opposed to doing so only over a period of many weeks or longer.

Against this background, it can be fairly asked how the United States is able to devise foreign and defense policies, set in train the means for carrying them out, and build political support for them. There are several answers to this question. But one of the most important has been the creation of a set of institutions that, in their scope and pervasive nature, has no parallel in other countries — institutions that are known, in characteristic American jargon, as “think tanks.”

This term is only a few decades old, but the idea of creating institutions that focus both on the study of foreign policy and the building of support for it has a long pedigree in the 20th century. For example, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace was created in 1910 to advance the cause of peace. Then Councils of Foreign Relations were set up in New York and Chicago in 1921 and 1922, respectively, the former founded by “businessmen, bankers, and lawyers determined to keep the United States engaged in the world;” the latter a group of “concerned Chicagoans united by a common interest in international affairs and a concern over ‘ignorance and half-considered proposals on the subject.’” These efforts, designed to draw together, educate, and energize American elites, came just as the era of isolationism was setting in.

But the great flowering of research and policy institutions in the United States occurred only after World War II, when it became clear that the U.S. would henceforth have to be deeply and permanently engaged abroad, and that it would have to exercise a high degree of leadership, both in creating and enabling new international institutions to be effective — such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — and in drawing the democracies together to meet the growing challenge from the Soviet Union and communism. For the first time in its history, the United States needed a fully-developed, comprehensive, and understandable grand strategy. The American think tank came to the rescue.

Perhaps the first such institution created in the post-war era was what is now the RAND Corporation. It sprang from the desire of leaders in the newly-created U.S. Air Force to devise purposes and programs for their new military service. To ensure that the research institution to be created would not just be a reflection of bureaucratic thinking, it was set up as far from Washington as possible, in Santa Monica, California. High-quality, objective research on national security became the institution’s first hallmark. Over the years, the Pentagon created several other think tanks devoted exclusively to defense issues (RAND has subsequently found other sponsors, in and out of government, in many different fields). These have included the Institute for Defense Analyses and the Center for Naval Analyses. These research institutes have their analogues in the hard sciences, including two run by the University of California: the Los Alamos National Laboratory (originally created in 1942 to design and build the first atomic bombs) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (set up a decade later, at first to create hydrogen weapons).

Also important in devising and shaping U.S. foreign policy was the creation of a plethora of other research institutes established across the country, some within private corporations or labor unions, some free-standing, and some attached to leading universities — ranging from the University of California at Los Angeles and Stanford University on the West Coast to Harvard and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on the East Coast. It has even been said, whimsically, that for every permutation and combination of the words “foreign,” “international,” “strategic,” “global,” “research,” “policy,” “center,” “institute,” and “council,” there is an American think tank with that as its title.

These various institutions serve many purposes, ranging from research into regional problems and functional issues, such as economics and military affairs, to work designed specifically to build popular understanding of, and political support for, U.S. involvement in the outside world and specific ideas and policies. There is
the United Nations Association, which is charged with increasing popular understanding of that institution, as well as the Atlantic Council, the Overseas Development Council, the Arms Control Association, and many world affairs councils, which are groups of local citizens interested in foreign policy, spread all across the country. Several other specialized think tanks have been created, such as the publicly-funded U.S. Institute of Peace, which focuses on research, and the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), which works primarily in other countries to promote democratic development. NED has four offshoots: two allied with the Republican and Democratic parties, one with labor, and one with business. And there is a host of other bodies, designed to promote one cause or another in foreign policy, often combining a research unit with public education and efforts to affect opinion within the Congress.

For many years, the think tanks that are most politically influential in shaping U.S. foreign policy have been based in Washington, D.C. Each of these has a deep interest in research, and most also have a public presence. Several stand out today, including the Carnegie Endowment, RAND, and the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations (the latter two having set up Washington offices), the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the American Enterprise Institute (with significant ties to the corporate world), the Institute for Policy Studies (known for its liberal views), and the Heritage Foundation (known for its conservative views).

Each of these institutions and their companions has its own particular focus, or niche; some are identified with one or another part of the political spectrum, and some try scrupulously to be bipartisan or simply non-partisan. Some focus on publications and gaining exposure for their research staff in the media, some focus on providing advice to members of Congress, some try to influence the administration currently in office — and some do all of these things. All are interested in ideas and, given the nature of foreign policy, in having an impact on power, directly or indirectly; and all have some role in education, whether for the general public or just elites — leaders in different professions, in both private and public sectors.

Two features of the American foreign affairs think tank are particularly important. First, many of them are concerned with bringing people together to discuss ideas and policy options, often from different disciplines — academia, business, government, and, within government, people from both the administration and Congress. Nor are these activities designed only to share information or to develop the best ideas. They are also designed to build support for policies and, even more broadly, to help create consensus, to the degree possible, about which issues are most important, what the great differences of viewpoint are, and what approach the United States should follow. This is the foreign affairs think tank as “secret weapon.” It brings together people with different perspectives and roles in the overall U.S. political process — both in and out of government and from Congress as much as from the administration. Where this co-mingling of people and policy ideas works, it helps to foster a major element in the making of U.S. foreign policy — the forging of bipartisanship. As every administration, and every Congress, has learned, it is when a bipartisan approach to a policy can be crafted that that policy has the best chance of succeeding, both at home (in gaining support) and abroad (in carrying the authority and the commitment of the nation behind it).

Second, the foreign affairs think tanks are a major source of talented people to serve in an administration and on congressional staffs. And they are a haven for departing government officials who want to remain engaged in foreign policy, to gain new ideas and inspiration, while also enriching the think tanks’ research projects and symposia with insights gained from government service. Virtually unique to the United States, this “in and out” movement of officials, often swapping jobs with counterparts in think tanks, is a critical element in bringing new ideas into government, and it plays a significant role in building support among leaders of the various public-policy professions regarding the major directions for the nation abroad.

Indeed, few people ascend to senior foreign policy and national security office in the U.S. government without having first passed through one or another think tank, whether as staff members, contributors to publications, or simply as participants in study groups or other types of meetings. The current secretary of state, Madeleine Albright, led one such institute, the Center for National Policy. At the same time, the value of these
think tanks to America’s wider purposes is reflected in the fact that almost all of them are exempt from taxation — either on income generated from their activities, or on contributions made to them by individual Americans or grant-giving philanthropies. The government, in short, subsidizes the think tanks.

In sum, the growth of the role played by the American think tank in foreign and national security policy has been a natural response to the deepening engagement of the United States in the world during the past half century. It has helped to train America’s leaders, shape future policies (beyond those being developed within government at the moment, where outsiders can play only a limited part), engage the Congress, enlist leaders in a wide variety of professions with an interest in public policy, and educate the American public. Indeed, the think tank has become indispensable to U.S. foreign policy and to America’s role in the outside world.
Reminiscing years after the most profound foreign policy crisis of the Cold War — the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis — then-Defense Secretary Robert McNamara commented almost casually that he did not turn on a television set the entire time President Kennedy and his advisors were dealing with events that could have thrust the United States and the Soviet Union into nuclear war. Fast-forward the clock to the 1999 conflict in Kosovo, and it is clear how astonishingly the role of the news media (and information generally) has grown in the making of U.S. foreign policy. From the TV images of fleeing ethnic Albanian refugees to the propaganda war on the Internet to the councils of President Clinton's top aides debating how to communicate their objectives, information played a major — even dominant — role in U.S. foreign policy during the Kosovo conflict.

How has the revolution in global information technology changed the making of U.S. foreign policy? First, a few words of caution. Today's media-rich world has not replaced the need for strong diplomatic leadership. If anything, it has reinforced that need. If U.S. leadership is uncertain — as it was at times in hotspots such as Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia — the news media (and U.S. adversaries, using the media), move quickly to fill the vacuum. Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Mohammed Farah Aided in Somalia, and Slobodan Milosevic in the former Yugoslavia used the news media, particularly television, to complicate achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives.

Nor does the media replace confidential diplomacy. It complements it. Leaders in Washington may get news of a crisis first from CNN rather than embassy cables, but diplomats are still necessary to provide the detailed political reporting from foreign lands. U.S. foreign policy-makers routinely use the news media to deliver messages to foreign leaders, particularly during crises when diplomatic contact with an adversary may be cut off. But other messages can be delivered only through private diplomatic exchanges. Serbia's military withdrawal from Kosovo was ultimately achieved through face-to-face Russian-European-American diplomacy, backed by the use of NATO air power.

Still, global real-time television, the Internet, and other recent technological advances have clearly affected how top foreign policy-makers do their job. Nowhere is this change more starkly seen than in the time pressures officials now face. McNamara's long days behind closed doors advising Kennedy on the Cuba crisis are an unimaginable luxury to his counterparts today. The rapid transmission of information and a ubiquitous media with questions at the ready mean that officials must make decisions and state policy publicly more rapidly than they might like. Telling the media and the public to wait for answers is always an option, but usually one that makes officials look unprepared or vacillating. The time crunch, combined with an adversary's own "information warfare," can lead to mistakes. NATO's incomplete account of the accidental bombing of a refugee convoy in Kosovo, later amended several times, sapped the alliance's credibility at a key point during Operation Allied Force.

But like most changes brought on by the Information Age, this one is a two-edged sword. In making and executing foreign policy, the ability to communicate...
rapidly and directly with both allies and enemies — and their publics too, in some cases — is a great advantage. President Bush, worried that Saddam Hussein was surrounded by aides afraid to bring him bad news and concerned that he would conclude from U.S. anti-war protests that Washington lacked resolve, used television on several occasions to address the Iraqi leader directly during the 1990-91 Persian Gulf crisis. More recently, President Clinton, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and other top U.S. officials used the media to address numerous audiences during the Kosovo campaign. As conflicts, diplomacy, and peacekeeping increasingly become multilateral affairs, this will become a more challenging task. Sometimes, messages with different nuances or emphases need to be sent to different audiences.

Since the end of the Cold War, there have been not one, but two, revolutions that have affected the communicating of U.S. foreign policy. The global telecommunications explosion is one. The second is the geopolitical revolution: without the Soviet threat, foreign affairs can seem less immediately vital to many Americans. Together, these changes have caused senior policy-makers to adopt more complex and creative communications strategies, using a variety of new and old media. Press conferences by the secretary of state and background briefings for the State Department press corps are still important, but they are not enough. While visiting Argentina in 1998, President Clinton participated in a televised town hall discussion with young Hispanics in both South America and the United States, underscoring the United States' desire for an integrated hemisphere. This year, the State Department’s annual human rights report was on the Internet the same day it was released — and accessed, no doubt, by journalists, non-governmental human rights groups, and the foreign governments cited in the document. Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in places such as Kosovo, which combine military deployments with diplomacy, offer an especially challenging communications environment. Target audiences include international, regional, and local media; U.S. troops and the troops of other contributing nations; local ethnic groups that may have grievances; and neighboring countries that may wish to see the effort succeed — or fail.

The U.S. military, in particular, has had to adjust its dealings with the media. In times of war or other national emergency, the news media and information flows can be controlled to some extent via formal means (i.e., selected groups of journalists known as press “pools,” escorted by public affairs officers, and security reviews of stories) or informal ones. Peacekeeping and humanitarian operations — known to the military as “operations other than war” — offer no such opportunity for officials. In places such as Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo, journalists may be “on the ground” before troops ever arrive and, because of political concerns over military casualties, may be less restricted in their movements than the soldiers. The U.S. military has gone back to school — literally in some cases, with heavier doses of media training. A plethora of conferences and writings has explored this new military-media relationship, as both sides try to understand better one another’s needs in the new environment. Given their starkly different professions and cultures, however, it seems certain that some tensions will linger.

The news media, again television in particular, can affect the agenda of U.S. foreign policy. From 1992 until 1995, Presidents Bush and Clinton did not believe the war in Bosnia threatened U.S. interests sufficiently to send in U.S. ground troops. But near non-stop coverage of the carnage and humanitarian suffering ensured that they had to deal with the conflict nonetheless. Similarly, when organized violence broke out following East Timor’s referendum on independence last year, it was not perceived initially as a major issue on the administration’s agenda. TV images and journalists questioning the administration’s policy ensured that it was on the White House agenda, nonetheless. Conversely, there may be less pressure to attend to conflicts, such as the civil wars in West Africa, if they do not generate media attention and no other national security interest is involved.

One of the most interesting developments brought on by the Information Age has been a democratization in access to media tools, meaning more and more groups can affect foreign policy. As mentioned at the outset, policy-makers and diplomats have not seen their places usurped. But they now must share the arena with non-governmental actors, including human rights and relief groups, loose coalitions of activists on various causes, even guerrilla armies and terrorists. While President Bush made the ultimate decision to send U.S. troops to
Somalia in 1992 to safeguard relief supplies, it is now known that a loose coalition of relief groups such as CARE, members of Congress, and mid-level U.S. officials helped direct Bush’s attention to the starvation in Somalia by encouraging and facilitating media coverage there. Similarly, “progressive” groups used the Internet to organize protests against the World Trade Organization that disrupted its 1999 Seattle meeting, and to change U.S. policy toward Burma by achieving a series of state-level sanctions on that country.

Does the news media actually change U.S. foreign policy? Not nearly as much as some argue. But it does seem to have an impact in one narrowly defined area: humanitarian relief policy. Television images of people suffering from famine, disease, or natural disasters can, by their effect on world public opinion (or presumed effect, in policy-makers’ minds) get the United States and other industrialized nations involved where they might not be otherwise. Beginning with the famine in Ethiopia in the mid-1980s, this has happened time and again, from the refugee exodus from Rwanda in 1994 to the humanitarian crisis caused by the wars in the former Yugoslavia to the devastating floods in Mozambique in 2000. As already mentioned, often it is not the media alone, but non-governmental organizations working through the media to draw attention to a region, that affect policy. One concern is whether television skews policy-making toward humanitarian concerns, and away from the more difficult (and risky) job of solving underlying conflicts. In the apt words of Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze, “The dictatorship of the fourth power, the dictatorship of the TV picture, horrifying millions of people with images of mass violence, urges us to adopt humanitarian decisions and to avoid political ones.”

U.S. diplomats, by and large, do not spend their time reading public opinion polls. But they, and even more so officials at the White House, believe they have a good sense of the U.S. public’s mood from the media, their public affairs advisers, and their own past experience. That is one reason why news media reports alone are not enough to send U.S. troops into harm’s way if no national interest seems at risk. Despite heavy media coverage, the United States did not intervene to stop the genocide in Rwanda. Neither President Bush nor President Clinton supported sustained U.S. military involvement in Bosnia until the latter sensed that the war there was threatening a major U.S. security interest — the cohesion of NATO and the Atlantic alliance. In other situations, such as Haiti and Kosovo, national interests caused U.S. policy-makers to choose intervention even in the face of a skeptical Fourth Estate.

One final example shows how the media’s role in U.S. diplomacy is not always what it appears, and how policy-makers use the media as much as they are used by it. It is widely believed that the February 1994 “marketplace massacre” in Sarajevo, captured on videotape, changed U.S. policy in Bosnia to a much more aggressive, interventionist role. Sixty-eight people were killed, and almost 200 others horribly wounded, when a mortar shell, believed fired by Bosnian Serbs, fell on the Bosnian capital’s central market. Within days, NATO demanded that the Bosnian Serbs withdraw their heavy weapons from an “exclusion zone” around Sarajevo, under threat of air strikes. For the first time since the war began in April 1992, Sarajevo experienced a taste of normalcy.

This is what actually happened: In the days before the mortar shell fell, the United States, under heavy pressure from France, had concluded that the current U.S. policy was not working. Then-Secretary of State Warren Christopher had written a memo to senior colleagues at the White House and the Pentagon, laying out the case for a more proactive U.S. policy. Meetings on the details of that new policy were actually under way when the mortar shell fell. The videotaped horrors helped the Clinton administration get public backing for the more aggressive policy that it wanted to undertake. Numerous top officials have confirmed this sequence of events in subsequent interviews. And where did then-U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright and her colleagues go to make the case for the new policy? In front of the TV cameras, of course.

Foreign policy isn’t made by the media. But in the Information Age, it can’t be made without it.

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THE INTERNET AND THE DIFFUSION OF DIPLOMACY

An assessment by Dr. Richard H. Solomon

“One of the most profound ways” the Internet “affects U.S. foreign policy is by accelerating the policy-making process,” says Dr. Richard H. Solomon, president of the United States Institute of Peace. Describing the phenomenon of the “diffusion of diplomacy,” Solomon explains how the Internet “has thrown open governments’ gates to new constituencies who are not limited by traditional geographic or other physical barriers from actively participating” in the creation of policy. Following are Solomon’s responses to questions posed by “U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda.”

**Question:** How would you assess the impact of the Internet — as an international force — on the development of U.S. foreign policy?

**Solomon:** When discussing the role of the Internet in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy, it is important to keep in mind that we are still in the early stages of the information revolution. Not enough concrete information yet exists to fully comprehend the impact the Internet will have on the practice of diplomacy and, specifically, the development of U.S. foreign policy. That said, however, work and research resulting from the Institute’s five-year-old Virtual Diplomacy Initiative points toward a couple of significant ways that the Internet is affecting the foreign policy-making process and thereby U.S. foreign policy.

One of the most profound ways it affects U.S. foreign policy is by accelerating the policy-making process. Information about breaking international crises that once took hours or days for government officials and media to disseminate is now being relayed real-time to the world not only via radio and television, but over the Internet as well. Ironically, though, for policy-makers, instant dissemination of information about events both far and near is proving to be as much a bane as a bounty.

While the Internet has augmented and expedited the information-gathering phase of policy-making, the amount of time available to policy-makers to digest, analyze, and formulate potential courses of action has been proportionally reduced in relation to how much and how fast information is publicly available. In today’s wired world, policy-makers now are often called upon to make virtually instantaneous decisions about what are often complicated international crises that require delicate handling. However, as Under Secretary of State Thomas Pickering noted at an Institute conference earlier this year, too much data can be as detrimental as too little — policy-makers must always be on guard for the spin, advocacy, and marketing that often accompany much of the information found on the Internet.

At the same time, and related to the profusion of information and the collapse of absorption, reflection, and response time, is policy-makers’ forced adjustment to the Internet’s decentralizing effect on the formulation of U.S. foreign policy — we call this phenomenon the “diffusion of diplomacy.” The Internet has thrown open governments’ gates to new constituencies who are not limited by traditional geographic or other physical barriers from actively participating in the policy-making process. Increasingly we are seeing individuals and groups who use the Internet to form virtual communities that can mobilize easily and effectively for advocacy and action. They not only use the Internet to gather information but also to broadcast information globally and to advocate specific policy actions on everything from trade to human rights policies. It is safe to say that the challenge of managing what can best be described today as “information chaos” is likely to daunt policy-makers in the United States and around the globe for many years to come.

Q: How is the Internet affecting the way that U.S. foreign policy-makers are conducting business?
Solomon: One of the greatest advantages afforded by modern communication technologies such as the Internet is the heightened flexibility they offer their users, whether individuals, organizations, or nation states. Greater flexibility also means that different actors in the foreign policy-making process are affected by the Internet and the information revolution in slightly different ways. For example, last year during the height of the Kosovo conflict, the Institute was able to make the proceedings of a conference featuring several prominent Balkan policy-makers, including the presidents of Bulgaria and Albania, available to policymakers across the globe through a live webcast. In effect, each spoke simultaneously to a regional constituency in the Balkans, NATO allies, and Washington policymakers.

Policy-makers within the Executive Branch are finding that the Internet aids intra-organizational communication between agencies working on different aspects of the same crisis. E-mail, Intranets, and other such technologies quickly and efficiently circulate critical data and, more importantly, allow for the sharing of information not only between offices just down the hall from each other but also between headquarters and field offices halfway across the globe. Presidential Decision Directive 56, which calls for interagency coordination during complex emergencies, can only succeed in a real-time response environment if agencies rely on electronic communication internally and externally.

Such efficient use and integration of these new technologies by government and non-governmental organizations alike have helped flatten traditionally bureaucratic structures. Hierarchical flattening presents a particular challenge to U.S. diplomats abroad — especially in the conduct of diplomacy. The diminishing cost of transnational communication prior even to the Internet has increasingly marginalized the in-country traditional diplomatic role. It is easier for a State Department official in Washington to pick up the telephone and resolve issues with his or her counterpart in Paris or Cairo than to wait until the in-country diplomat has taken care of the matter.

Meanwhile in-country diplomats, also operating in the real-time environment, are increasingly pressured for on-the-spot policy formulation or risk appearing disengaged. Without doubt, the information revolution has effaced the line separating those in the field from Washington-based policy-makers. Not only has the revolution drastically improved the quantity and quality of information available to diplomats in the field but it also has delivered more and more accurate information to senior foreign policy-makers, thereby strengthening their capacity to devise policies that will effectively meet the rapidly changing needs of today’s post-Cold War world. Though, as former Secretary of State George Shultz pointed out at an Institute Virtual Diplomacy conference in 1997, we still need both diplomats in the field and policy-makers in Washington. The real added value comes from the strength of the connection between them.

Q: How is the Internet changing the way that governments interact with each other?

Solomon: With the end of the Cold War and the threat of global nuclear war more remote, the world faces a less immediately deadly future. The road into that future, nevertheless, may be more difficult to navigate than before. One way that the Internet and the information revolution can assist international actors to travel more safely down this road is by making transparent intra- and international activities. For instance, the new information technologies offer governments a tremendous opportunity to educate and inform new publics and audiences about positions, policies, and activities. The Institute has identified this opportunity and has been on the forefront of examining ways to convene foreign affairs practitioners online — or as we like to say, “virtually” — and creating electronic links among global communities that share an interest in international conflict resolution.

Of course total transparency on the part of governmental agents may not always be in the national interest; nevertheless, the explosion of available information is a strong testament to the Internet’s effectiveness as a communication tool for both governmental and other international actors. Without doubt, this new capacity can be and is being used to fulfill particular interests and meet various ends — though not always in each state’s interest. Joseph Nye, dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, and Admiral William Owen, co-CEO (chief executive officer) of the high tech firm Teledesic, have termed this use of information power...
“soft power,” which is in counter distinction to a state’s hard or coercive power represented by its military force. The use of soft power can range from a government making valuable information resources publicly accessible on the Internet to “spinning” a particular take on a specific policy or activity. Soft power allows governments to easily and effectively relay information to individuals who will never visit their embassies, consulates, or otherwise even set foot in their territory.

Even so, despite the increasingly invaluable role the Internet plays in facilitating interaction and enhancing the quality and quantity of communication between governments and their citizens, as well as among states, it will never replace the unique quality of person-to-person communication between states and other international actors. Astonishing as advances have been during the past 10 years, at the end of the day, the Internet and all of the hardware and software that keep it running are still merely instruments of human action.

Q: Is there any way that you can foresee overcoming Internet restrictions imposed by countries like China and Burma?

SOLOMON: No one, neither here in the United States nor elsewhere, should underestimate the power of the free flow of information via the Internet. Efforts by countries such as China or Burma to circumscribe the Internet to its will are unlikely to succeed in the long run. The Internet is designed as a dynamic system to share information based on an open architecture, which, by its nature, is nearly impossible to constrain. There are so many ways that citizens are able to connect to the Internet, either directly or indirectly, that most regulatory or technological barriers are unable to keep determined individuals off the Net. Also, not only does the Internet’s dynamic nature resist control, its decentralized infrastructure renders its regulation beyond the scope of territorially-based governance. No one person or state owns it, no one person or state runs it. It exists by virtue of agreed protocols that allow anyone with a modem and a PC to join the global community as a “netizen” and, once admitted, membership is hard to revoke.

More importantly, even if the Chinese government could control access to the Internet in China, it is unlikely that it is in its best interest to do so. As I stressed earlier, information in today’s wired world has become a valuable resource within the international system. Much in the way that states for centuries leveraged their natural resources (oil springs to mind) to gain a competitive advantage in the international arena, accurate, timely information is today recognized as an equally valuable international commodity.

Governments must rethink how and why to categorize information as either publicly available or classified. For example, the U.S. government has found that releasing previously classified remotely sensed data from earth-orbiting satellite systems has proven to be invaluable to non-governmental and international organizations working in a crisis zone, as well as a potentially lucrative commodity to a wide assortment of companies in the United States.

Countries like China and Burma may find themselves at a distinct economic and political disadvantage by limiting how their own industries and citizens use most effectively new information technologies like the Internet.

Q: To what extent is the Internet having an impact among foreign policy elites in closed societies such as North Korea?

SOLOMON: It is difficult to answer the question of what kind and how much access members of closed societies such as North Korea have. As access to the Internet allows for multiple views to be aired, unfettered access to the Internet in closed societies can quite obviously be problematic to their rulers. Yet it is highly unlikely that high ranking government officials and foreign policy elites in countries such as North Korea or China are either unaware of the power of the Internet or entirely cut off from it. This knowledge surely influences their behavior on the international scene.

We know that some information from the Internet is reaching people in such closed societies as Burma, China, and North Korea. An Institute report recently published and posted on our website described the famine in North Korea. We later learned that it was downloaded and circulated among non-governmental organizations (NGOs) working in North Korea. Another Institute report on the dire situation in Serbia was downloaded and reprinted for general distribution.
by Serbian independent media in Belgrade. In fact, two journalists from two different major magazines in Belgrade called to tell the Institute how heartened they were to learn from the report that Americans were able to recognize that not all of the Serbian people agreed with the policies of the Milosevic regime.

Q: How are governments and groups around the world using the Internet to coalesce and mobilize resources for shared foreign policy objectives?

Solomon: One of the goals of the Institute’s Virtual Diplomacy Initiative is to help governmental and non-governmental foreign affairs practitioners understand how best to use today’s information and communication technologies to cope with challenges of a post-Cold War world. In particular, one of the most exciting Virtual Diplomacy projects that the Institute is currently working on is an examination of how governments and non-governmental actors can work together to share information as they address complex humanitarian crises. The project is looking at how governmental and non-governmental actors who may never have worked together relate to each other operationally as they try to tackle the daunting situation before them. By investigating a series of case studies, we are attempting to identify and dismantle obstacles that prevent these various entities from effectively sharing and pooling information as they mobilize their collective resources. We are working in partnership with those who have operational experience in crisis management to develop information-sharing mechanisms that will allow actors to pool their resources while meeting their own individual organization objectives and constraints as they address a complex international emergency.

It is a particularly daunting challenge when military and non-governmental organizations, many even internationally based, all attempt to work together in a conflict zone. This was a major lesson from our 1994 conference, “Managing Chaos,” which brought together for the first time members of the NGO community, U.S. and international policy-makers, and members of the military to talk about the challenges of working together in the field on complex humanitarian emergencies. Ironically, we found that the greatest obstacle prohibiting these actors from easily distributing and pooling information resources was not technical at all; rather it was their own respective internal organizational differences, protocols, and constraints.

Q: How long do you think it will be before international grassroots organizations seeking to impact U.S. foreign policy will be able to utilize the Internet to a maximum extent?

Solomon: The ability for these virtual communities of “netizens” to bring pressure to bear on governments and other international actors through e-mail and Internet campaigns has already proven effective in a number of cases. By far the most famous is the successful Internet campaign to ban landmines — winning the international community’s endorsement as well as the Nobel Peace Prize. Another example — the topic of a study that the Institute funded in its early stages — is the successful campaign by cyber activists, comprised of college students and members of the Burmese Diaspora, to persuade the commonwealth of Massachusetts to sanction U.S. corporations doing business in both Massachusetts and Burma. Their objective was, and is, to support the pro-democracy movement in Burma. Massachusetts’s sanctions, however, were in direct opposition to U.S. foreign policy toward Burma at the time.

Although the question of whether the legislation enacted by Massachusetts overstepped the U.S. Constitution is now before the federal court, there is little doubt that the Internet played a role in raising the profile of this issue in the eyes of many in Washington. As noted in a recent Foreign Affairs article, the enactment of the law in Massachusetts and subsequent Internet-generated attention to U.S.-Burman relations caused U.S. policy-makers to adjust their earlier positions vis-à-vis mounting international public opinion. The case demonstrates that the Internet has forever altered the power of netizens to influence the development of U.S. foreign policy without ever setting foot inside the nation’s capital.

Q: How is USIP’s agenda focusing on issues related to the Internet and the making of foreign policy?

Solomon: The U.S. Institute of Peace practices what it preaches. In other words, the Institute actively uses new information and communication technologies to educate and make available to individuals worldwide
the research and other information resources that the Institute produces that address local, regional, and international conflicts. For example, the Institute’s Peace Agreements Digital Collection, available on our website, www.usip.org, seeks to enhance comparative studies about approaches to peacemaking with special regard to such issues as refugees and displaced populations, amnesty, military reform, and the demobilization of military forces. This online collection allows negotiators and other interested individuals to compare different experiences involving different conflicts and to reflect on and apply the lessons to their own situations.

We are also using new multimedia technologies to expand the audience for Institute events and guest speakers beyond those within Washington, D.C. In February 2000, during the Institute’s first completely self-produced live webcast, global audiences were invited to virtually attend the event and were encouraged to submit questions to the panel. One of the questions we received during the webcast was from a viewer in Mongolia — an excellent illustration of how organizations can use the Internet to reach new audiences and provide educational resources that go far beyond the physical walls of their respective institutions. This represents a trend that ultimately will prove of great utility for individuals in the private, public, and non-profit sectors, irrespective of what language they may speak or what region they might call home.

For more information on the Institute’s Virtual Diplomacy Initiative please contact Virtual Diplomacy Directors Sheryl Brown or Margarita Studemeister at {virtual_diplomacy@usip.org}. Virtual Diplomacy papers and conference proceedings mentioned in the preceding transcript can be found online at: “http://www.usip.org/nr/virtual_dipl.html”. 
Citizen participation in the legislative process is one of the cornerstones of the U.S. democratic system. From electing members of Congress who support their policy positions to writing a letter to the U.S. president, U.S. citizens directly influence the decisions of foreign policy-makers.

This influence is compounded when individuals band together for a common cause and form special interest groups. There are several thousand such groups in the United States advocating policy positions on a wide range of issues. Currently, more than 3,700 special interest groups are registered to lobby members of Congress and the administration. Some of the most influential of them can mobilize hundreds of thousands of voters for their cause. And the groups that demonstrate the ability to carry out skilled and active grassroots campaigns wield significant influence in Washington, D.C.

THE POWER OF THE CONSTITUENT VOICE

Members of Congress recognize that their primary responsibility is to please the constituents who elected them to public office. To do that, they must cast legislative votes that are largely reflective of their constituents’ concerns or be prepared to justify an unpopular vote when it comes time for re-election.

Although elected representatives are frequently directed by the leadership of the House of Representatives and the Senate to vote along party lines, they nonetheless pay great attention to public opinion polls and the views of the voters in their district or state. Elected representatives place tremendous importance on the policy positions expressed in constituent letters, telephone calls, e-mail messages, and personal meetings. For every individual who places a telephone call or writes a letter to his elected official, it is widely assumed that as many as 10 additional voting citizens support that same position. Thus the effect of one act of lobbying can be magnified at least ten-fold. If a member of Congress receives a significant number of constituent responses on an issue, and his party leadership asks him to vote in opposition to these responses, it is often the voice of the constituents that sways the final vote.

Constituents can increase their influence by joining a special interest group or national association. As members of a national association, they participate in its internal policy-making process and rely on the organization’s elected officials or professional staff to lobby Congress on their behalf. Thus one lobbyist for such an association speaks for many when representing policy positions before Congress.

The impact of this approach is magnified when national associations join together to form coalitions that speak with one voice on policy matters, making it difficult for their views to be ignored. Coalition letters are a mainstay in Washington and provide a quick and effective means for like-minded organizations to demonstrate widespread support for a policy position.

EFFECTIVE FOREIGN POLICY LOBBYING

The most successful foreign affairs lobbyists are those who establish themselves as experts on specific policy
matters, create well-crafted messages to articulate why a member of Congress should vote a certain way, and maintain close working relationships with key members — including relevant committee chairmen and the leadership in the Senate and House of Representatives — and with their staffs.

“Expert” lobbyists are pivotal in the Washington lobbying process. Members of Congress and their staffs, administration officials, foreign officials, and even other lobbyists seek their advice, and in the process, the experts gather additional information that serves to reinforce their expertise. An expert’s influence is magnified accordingly if the organization he or she represents demonstrates an ability to amass sizeable grassroots responses on specific policy matters.

Expert lobbyists must have access to the most recent information in their subject areas. Relevant information can be gathered through media reports, networking with members of Congress or the administration, meeting with representatives of foreign countries and other foreign policy lobbyists, reading publications that specialize in foreign policy issues, and attending professional seminars and conferences.

The most credible of these lobbyists have specialized career backgrounds from which they draw their expertise. Above all else, successful foreign affairs lobbyists make an art form of networking with influential people and utilizing each contact to their advantage.

**LOBBYING ON A SPECIFIC FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE**

One lobbying group that wields tremendous grassroots influence is the American Farm Bureau Federation. Founded in 1919, the Farm Bureau is the largest agricultural organization in the United States. With more than 4.9 million member families in the 50 U.S. states and Puerto Rico, Farm Bureau members produce every commodity grown in the nation. The Farm Bureau’s ability to mobilize grassroots support on domestic and international issues that affect agriculture has earned it widespread recognition as a national voice for U.S. farmers and ranchers.

The Farm Bureau plays an important role in lobbying for passage of foreign policy legislation that has a direct bearing on agriculture, including extension of Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status for China. The U.S. Congress has granted NTR status — the same trade preferences that it gives to other nations — to China on an annual basis. The sixth largest market for U.S. agricultural exports, China reciprocates by keeping its market open to U.S. exports. Denial of NTR status would seriously jeopardize the U.S.-China trading relationship. Widely viewed as an economic matter, annual passage of NTR for China has foreign policy significance.

U.S. engagement with China has been at the forefront of the U.S. foreign policy agenda with Asia since President Nixon re-established diplomatic ties with China nearly 30 years ago. The U.S.-China relationship subsequently became the subject of annual debate in Washington during congressional deliberations on whether to confer trade benefits to it. Although the Senate consistently agrees with the president to renew NTR, there is generally a resolution introduced in the House of Representatives to deny U.S. trading privileges to China.

What should be a debate on the merits of keeping two-way trade flowing between China and the United States becomes a debate on non-trade issues of tremendous significance on the foreign policy front. Some members of Congress, reflecting the views of constituency groups who are opposed to extending preferential trade treatment to China, cite, as reasons for denying NTR status, human rights issues, alleged espionage of U.S. nuclear weapon technology, allegations of illegal campaign financing, and China’s long-standing political strife with Tibet and Taiwan.

Special interest groups greatly influence the annual China debate in the U.S. Congress. Some groups believe strongly that China should be penalized for its actions on the non-trade front and therefore advocate denying NTR to China. Others believe that engagement through trade is a viable means to foster democratic reform in China and therefore support NTR renewal. Both views dominate media reports for the 60 days during which the House deliberates on this issue, yet the debate consistently ends with an affirmative vote in the House to maintain normalized trade with China. In 1999, the vote sailed through the House with a margin of 260-170 in favor of NTR extension.
Hoping to sway the final vote on NTR in their favor, agriculture and business groups flood members of the House with telephone calls, e-mail messages, constituent and coalition letters, and specialized briefings for congressional members and their staffs to educate them further on the benefits of passage.

The Farm Bureau annually mobilizes its grassroots membership in support of normalized trade with China. In addition to constituent telephone calls, coalition letters, and meetings with House members in their Washington, D.C., and district offices, the Farm Bureau boosts membership participation by establishing automated services that facilitate the letter-writing and telephone-calling campaign. For example, an automated toll free number is established that, when called by a Farm Bureau member, will generate a personalized letter to that member's representative extolling the virtues of extending NTR to China. Moreover, the Farm Bureau solicits its key members throughout the country to make personal contact with targeted representatives who have not yet confirmed their support for NTR passage.

This year, the stakes for trade engagement with China are even higher. The United States and China have concluded bilateral trade negotiations for China's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in which China has agreed to significantly open its market to agricultural imports. This agreement paves the way to an increasingly valuable trade relationship with China for U.S. farmers and ranchers.

In order to benefit from China's accession agreement, WTO rules require that the United States grant unconditional NTR to China on a permanent basis. The Farm Bureau, along with other agricultural and business organizations, has galvanized its members to secure congressional support for permanent NTR. However, certain special interest groups oppose China's membership in the WTO and are preparing to wage a massive campaign for its defeat. Their strategy for amassing grassroots opposition is expected to be matched by an intensive campaign by those groups that support its passage.

Congressional consideration of permanent NTR for China will test the lobbying skills and tactics of advocates on both sides of the debate. Each side will place great emphasis on its respective lobbying activities to communicate the stakes at issue.

Lobbying is a necessary and integral aspect of the U.S. legislative process. It ensures that the rights and concerns of U.S. citizens are taken into account before a bill becomes law. It gives a voice to the constituent in that process and thereby ensures that the principles of our democracy are upheld.
The United States has an unusually open foreign policy system. While the president and his principal lieutenants stand at the summit of foreign policy, they cannot act alone. Literally hundreds of agencies within the government help form decisions. Some of these departments and bureaus are obvious — the State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce Departments; the National Security Council; and the offices of the President’s Special Trade Representative and the President’s Coordinator for National Drug Policy. The foreign policy role of some other agencies is less immediately apparent, but the Energy and Justice Departments and the Immigration and Naturalization Service, for example, have major roles in the U.S. foreign policy process.

But the foreign policy of the United States can never be understood by looking solely at the government. Throughout American history, and especially in the 55 years since the end of World War II, men and women working outside the government have played major roles in shaping the contours of U.S. relations with the rest of the world. They have done so through writing, teaching, and appealing directly to Congress and the executive branch. They have worked through the political process to elect new administrations with different points of view.

Outsiders have often become insiders. Many of the most important government officials come from the private sector, serve for a few years, and then return to universities, research institutes, the media, business, or law firms. They continue to comment on and seek to influence the course of U.S. foreign relations from their positions outside the government. This constantly changing cast of characters produces an ongoing conversation over the direction and content of U.S. foreign policy. Sometimes the volume of the discussion makes it hard to comprehend individual voices or themes. But the very unruliness of the discourse makes it more democratic. Outsiders have regular opportunities to influence the course of public affairs. Government officials constantly are able to measure and refresh their views with the help of the most thoughtful, experienced, and committed members of the public.

People outside the government who are interested in foreign affairs have a dense web of outlets to use in helping policy-makers to set the diplomatic agenda and adopt specific policies for implementation. There are scores of journals of opinion devoted either exclusively or in large measure to foreign affairs. The journals Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The Public Interest, and The National Interest, just to mention a few of the most prominent, all feature articles on the outstanding issues of the day. All of them are read seriously by the top officials of the government. The authors of most of the articles in these journals come from outside the government. They are professors, bankers, business executives, lawyers, labor leaders, members of the clergy, and leaders of human rights and relief organizations.

These quarterly journals of opinion make up only a small portion of the outlets available for people outside the government to express their points of view. In addition, there are the weekly and monthly journals of opinion — such as The New Republic, The Nation, The National Review, and The Weekly Standard — that run the gamut of the political spectrum. For the most part,
their contributors do not have government positions.

Starting in the 1970s, the major newspapers of the country — *The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and The Los Angeles Times* — opened their columns to outsiders on what were called op-ed (“opposite the editorial”) pages. Now virtually every newspaper in the country has an op-ed department. These are filled with thoughtful comments, far more extensive than is possible in a letter to the editor. In the past 15 years, the number of electronic journalism outlets has exploded, offering another venue for the expression of views from the private sector. CNN, CNBC, MSNBC, Fox News, and many smaller radio and cable TV operators carry round-the-clock discussions of public affairs. The airwaves are filled with comments by non-governmental experts offering their opinions. Whenever there is a war or other international crisis or noteworthy event, these media spring into action to offer comprehensive coverage and a diversity of views on the situation as it unfolds.

In addition, outsiders use a variety of educational and public forums to bring influence to bear on contemporary foreign policy topics. Public seminars on the major issues of the day are conducted by the major schools of international relations including the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University, the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, and the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service, to name just a few. An influential role in this area also is played by research institutes such as The Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Brooking Institution, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the Council on Foreign Relations — all with headquarters or offices in Washington, D.C. At these institutions, faculty members and research fellows — many of whom have worked for the government and intend to do so again — express their views and consult with government officials on a range of foreign policy concerns.

What is most significant about the vast amount of public opinion available today is that government officials pay attention to it. They consider the comments of outsiders when creating, adjusting, and implementing their policies. Many U.S. government policies in the post-Cold War era — formulated in response to an array of international developments — have been profoundly influenced by the views of outsiders. Among them: humanitarian interventions in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti; the promotion of human rights in Bosnia and Kosovo; the creation and ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the World Trade Organization; restrictions on the use of landmines; the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); provision of economic assistance to former Communist states; relations with China and Taiwan; the normalization of relations with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; the continuation of economic sanctions on Cuba and Iraq; the promotion of peace in Northern Ireland; and the effort to resolve the dispute among Israel, the Arab states, and the Palestinians.

In every one of these episodes the U.S. government created policy in consultation with, and as a result of, the ideas and opinions of non-governmental actors and sometimes the pressure they exerted. On matters ranging from Northern Ireland to China and Taiwan, the entire spectrum of post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy issues has been influenced by the opinions of highly accomplished and thoughtful men and women who work outside the government.

The thriving community of non-governmental outsiders has been the source of many of the most important officials in every presidential administration of the past 40 years. Henry Kissinger probably set the standard. He made his reputation in the 1950s and 1960s as a professor of government at Harvard and a regular participant in the seminars and study groups of the Council on Foreign Relations. From 1969 to 1977 he served in the Nixon and Ford Administrations as national security adviser and secretary of state. Since 1977 he has been a private citizen who consults regularly with the U.S. government, private business, overseas governments, and political candidates.

This pattern has been followed repeatedly in recent years. Former Secretaries of State George Shultz, James Baker III, and Lawrence Eagleburger, and current Secretary of State Madeleine Albright have transferred easily back and forth between roles in government and academia. So did President Clinton's first national security adviser, Anthony Lake; his second secretary of defense, William Perry; and his second director of
central intelligence, John Deutch. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, a friend of President Clinton’s since their years together at Oxford as Rhodes Scholars in the late 1960s, worked for decades as a journalist for *Time* magazine before taking an official position in government. While Talbott wrote for *Time*, he delved deeply into the complexities of arms control, disarmament, and managing the transition to open markets in the former Soviet Union. Former Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin, who had immense authority over the foreign economic policy of the United States, came to government from the Wall Street financial world in New York. After he left office, he took another job as co-chairman of Citigroup, one of the nation’s largest banks and brokerage houses. His successor as secretary of the treasury, Lawrence Summers, had a distinguished career as a professor of economics at Harvard University before he joined the staff of the World Bank. From there he went to the Clinton Administration, serving on the president’s Economic Policy Council and then as deputy secretary of the treasury before becoming secretary in July 1999.

In all areas of U.S. foreign relations, policy emerges from a dialogue between public officials — elected and appointed — and private citizens. Some individuals who go back and forth between jobs in the private sector and government service report that they usually develop their most innovative and influential ideas while working outside the government. Many more people never work for the government at all, but the views they publish, discuss, and present in face-to-face meetings with government officials play an essential role in shaping American foreign policy.
Denning, Brannon P.; McCall, Jack H.  STATES’ RIGHTS AND FOREIGN POLICY (Foreign Affairs, vol. 79, no. 1, January/February 2000, pp. 9-14)

Discussing the impact of individual U.S. states on the nation’s foreign policy, Denning and McCall cite cases in which other nations have been targeted by state and local sanctions, which the authors say are unconstitutional. They review a Massachusetts statute that banned companies that did business with Burma from bidding on contracts to supply goods to that state. “Local sanctions represent an attempt by states to co-opt the power to set foreign policy” — a power that, under the Constitution, “clearly allocates to Washington,” the authors contend.

Lindsay, James M.  LOOKING FOR LEADERSHIP: DOMESTIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY (Brookings Review, vol. 18, no. 1, Winter 2000, pp. 40-43)

The American public, while not isolationist, remains disengaged from foreign policy concerns, believing that “no major challenge to U.S. security exists” — in the post-Cold War era, Lindsay says. Likewise, Congress, while largely desiring an active role in foreign policy design, is “divided by chamber, party, ideology, region, committee, and generation.” The result, he says, is little coherence or agreement on how foreign policy should proceed. He says more presidential leadership is needed to overcome legislative gridlock.


Rabkin says that a decade ago, conservatives routinely criticized what they termed congressional micromanaging of foreign policy, while today, liberals scorn the restrictions placed on American leadership by congressional conservatives. Some Clinton administration foreign policy initiatives, he says, have lacked congressional support because of their impact on domestic affairs. Rabkin disagrees with those who say the only way to break such foreign affairs impasses is for Congress to allow the president more leeway in international negotiations. On the contrary, he advocates firmer congressional involvement in order to prevent the president from negotiating commitments that cannot be honored or enforced.


Rieff believes that, under the Clinton administration, geoeconomic questions have been dealt with effectively but geopolitical questions have largely been avoided, or dealt with on an ad hoc basis. The result, he contends, has been that neither U.S. allies nor adversaries have had a clear idea of what direction U.S. policy will take next. “Effective policy-making needs to have as clear a sense of what involvement and commitments cannot or should not be made, as about what must be done even when sacrifices are required,” he says.

Tucker, Robert. ALONE OR WITH OTHERS (Foreign Affairs, vol.78, no.6, November/December 1999, pp.15-20)

Tucker examines the unilateralist and/or multilateralist tendencies of U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. He notes that the role of the United Nations “in determining the circumstances legitimizing force” has expanded considerably during the Clinton administration. “Pressed by its European allies,” he writes, “the administration accepted this expanded role for the Security Council and thereby may have created significant obstacles for future administrations confronted by the need to employ force and, in doing so, to act alone.”


Tension between the Executive and Congress over foreign policy is neither new, nor a unique product of the end of the Cold War, the author says. Under the U.S. Constitution, and based on experience, he notes, the two branches of government must develop U.S. policy by sharing powers and resolving their “creative tension.” Zoellick says that trade policy and the use of force are two critical areas where the experience and evolution in congressional processes are most evident and where, with vision, consultation, and an openness to debate, the present generation of political leaders can strive to meet national aspirations.
The Making of U.S. Foreign Policy
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